Alex Shipley

Alex Shipley was a Tennessee assistant attorney general and former Army captain whom Donald Segretti tried to recruit for a proposed political espionage operation against Democratic candidates. Shipley supplied a detailed account of the scheme’s proposed tactics and purpose, giving reporters a concrete view of how disruption might be organized beyond a single campaign headquarters. But his account also had a clear evidentiary limit: he had no proof that Segretti spoke for Richard Nixon’s campaign beyond Segretti’s own claim, and Shipley said he never carried out the assignments offered to him.

Identity and First Contact

In the summer of 1971, Shipley was living in Nashville and serving as an assistant attorney general for Tennessee. He and Segretti had been Army captains in the Judge Advocate General Corps and were both approaching the end of their military service. That shared background gave Segretti an existing personal connection through which to make his approach, rather than appearing as a stranger with an overt political proposal.

The account first reached the reporters indirectly. A lawyer told Carl Bernstein that a friend had been approached in an unusual way about working for the Nixon campaign; the friend was Shipley. When Bernstein reached Shipley at home, Shipley was surprised by the reporter’s interest and described the offer as slick. At first, Shipley did not name the recruiter. He said he had known the man in the Army and that the man claimed to be working for Nixon, but that he had no independent proof of the claim. Bernstein waited before pressing for the name. On a subsequent call, Shipley had assembled his notes and identified the recruiter as Donald Segretti.

The Proposed Operation

Shipley traced the first approach to a dinner at his apartment on June 26, 1971, followed by breakfast the next morning. He said Segretti had come to Washington for an interview at the Treasury Department. The fuller proposal emerged during the drive from the Georgetown Inn to Dulles Airport on June 27: Segretti asked whether Shipley would take part in an operation involving political espionage, then said the operation would work for Nixon. Shipley recalled being taken aback because the proposed actions would be directed at Democratic primaries.

The method described to Shipley depended on deception and infiltration. An operative might pose as a supporter of one Democratic candidate, approach that candidate’s workers, and encourage them to take jobs in another candidate’s campaign. Those workers would believe they were helping their preferred candidate; the operation would use the information they obtained for a different purpose. In another example, an operative could falsely claim to be a candidate’s field manager and tell a hall manager that trouble was expected, prompting the manager to postpone a rally until the venue was locked when the candidate arrived. A caller who first conveyed Shipley’s story to Bernstein also described a plan to mislead hall owners about rally schedules and reported that the proposed operation had virtually unlimited money. These were reported proposals, not actions Shipley said he had undertaken.

Segretti presented the larger purpose as preventing Democrats from regrouping after a bruising primary contest. In Shipley’s account, the aim was to create enough disorder that the party could not reunite afterward. The proposed work therefore extended beyond collecting information: it included recruiting people, placing them inside opposing campaigns, and disrupting campaign logistics. When Segretti later pressed Shipley about participation, Shipley recalled the instruction: “Enlist people—be imaginative.”

Recruitment Attempts and Shipley’s Response

Segretti continued to contact Shipley after the airport conversation. The following week, he called from Fort Ord, California, to renew the offer. On July 1, Shipley sought advice from a friend who had worked for Senator Albert Gore’s administrative assistant. Shipley said he was not interested, but wondered whether pretending to cooperate might help the Democrats learn more. The advice was cautious: “Don’t stick your neck out, but don’t say no; see what you can find out.” The exchange records Shipley considering how to respond, not agreeing to perform the proposed work.

On July 19, Segretti asked Shipley to think of five people he could contact about joining the operation. Shipley could not recall whether he supplied any names. On July 25, Segretti called from Chicago and said he had made a similar proposal to another Army captain, Roger Lee Nixt, stationed at an Army post there. Segretti wanted to fly to Washington to speak with Shipley; Shipley recalled that the question was essentially whether he was in or out. Three days later, Segretti asked him to fly to Atlanta to help enlist former Army captain Kenneth Griffiths. Shipley did not go.

Shipley described a repeated pattern in which he appeared to leave the door open verbally but did not follow through. He said he would answer Segretti’s proposals with assent, yet “I just never did anything about it.” The distinction matters: the reported recruitment effort included specific requests for names, travel, and assistance, but the evidence presented through Shipley does not establish that he recruited anyone or executed any disruption. His account also conveys the pressure of an escalating approach, as Segretti returned with new requests rather than treating the initial conversation as a completed recruitment.

Limits and Significance of His Account

The last contact Shipley recalled was October 23, 1971, when Segretti called from California and asked him to look into Edmund Muskie’s operation in Tennessee. Shipley again said he did not act. When asked where Segretti could be reached, Shipley said he had recently tried to find a Los Angeles telephone number but found no listing. Segretti had told him he would work at a law firm called Young and Segretti, which he described as a cover because he would be doing political work.

Shipley’s account gave the reporters dates, locations, recruiting requests, another prospective recruit, and examples of proposed deception. It also preserved an important uncertainty: Shipley’s impression that Segretti was working for Nixon rested on Segretti’s statement, not on documentary proof or an independently established chain of command. In the investigation’s reconstruction of political sabotage, Shipley therefore functioned as a direct witness to a recruitment pitch and its described methods, but not as proof by himself of who authorized or financed the operation. His repeated nonparticipation is equally central to the account: he was approached, asked to enlist others, and urged to investigate an opposing campaign, yet the actions he could personally confirm were Segretti’s proposals and his own decision not to carry them out.