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Howard Hunt—Gordon Liddy collaboration

All the President's Men

Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy collaborated within the White House Plumbers and were connected by shared travel, a White House complex telephone, and the routing of national-security wiretap transcripts. Their relationship links the administration’s leak investigations to the Watergate operation, but the surviving accounts distinguish evidence of association and shared work from proof of exactly what each man did in every operation.

Evidence of a Shared Operation

A confidential legal stipulation assembled for the Watergate defendants’ trial gave the reporters a dated record of Hunt and Liddy traveling together to Los Angeles under false names. The trips took place on September 4, 1971, January 7, 1972, and February 17, 1972. The dates mattered: both men were working at the White House during this period, months before the Watergate break-in. The travel record established repeated joint movement under assumed identities, though it did not by itself specify the purpose of each trip.

The reporters’ inquiry into the stipulation led them to a telephone installed on August 16, 1971, in room 16 of the Executive Office Building. It was disconnected on March 15, 1972, and had been registered to Kathleen Chenow, whose name and Alexandria address obscured its White House setting. Chenow had served as secretary to David Young, deputy on the Plumbers’ project. Her account identified the group as Hunt, Liddy, Young, and Egil Krogh, working on investigations of leaks to the news media and reporting to John Ehrlichman. Young, she said, regularly reported the progress of those investigations to Ehrlichman.

A Communications Link

Chenow identified the phone as Hunt’s and explained that it had been installed for her to answer and take messages for him. The detail connected Hunt’s use of a phone within the Executive Office Building to the covertly named subscriber, rather than to an ordinary White House listing. Chenow said the line rang about once a week, occasionally two or three times, and that Bernard Barker was nearly the only caller she remembered. Hunt and Barker were friendly on the phone; Hunt sometimes spoke Spanish to him. She recalled no other callers with confidence.

Chenow added that Liddy might sometimes have used the phone to speak with someone Hunt had called, whom she thought was probably Barker. Her qualification is important: the account supports a possible shared use of the line, not a complete call log or a definitive description of every conversation. Most calls, she recalled, came between August and November; by the time the phone was removed in March, it had not been used for a long time. The line therefore supplies a concrete, limited connection among Hunt, Liddy, and Barker, while leaving the substance of their communications largely unknown.

Leak Investigations and Wiretap Material

A separate account placed the two men together in the handling of surveillance information. A friend of Krogh recalled that Krogh had said Hunt and Liddy were receiving information from national-security wiretaps. The friend could not supply details. Following that lead, the reporters contacted people who had worked under Ehrlichman. One former and one current White House staff member independently described David Young as regularly forwarding transcripts of wiretapped conversations to Hunt and Liddy in 1971 and 1972. Both believed that reporters, as well as people suspected of leaking to them, might have been tapped.

The accounts thus describe more than a shared organizational label: Hunt and Liddy were identified as recipients of intelligence passed through Young, who worked on the Plumbers’ project. They also place that information within an administration surveillance policy that had authorized electronic eavesdropping without court approval. A later Time magazine account reported that the FBI had tapped the phones of reporters and government officials beginning in 1969, with John Mitchell authorizing each tap in writing, and that the practice continued until the Supreme Court decision of June 19, 1972. That broader context explains the stakes of the transcripts, but it does not establish that every person whose information reached Hunt and Liddy was in fact under surveillance.

Sponsorship, Scope, and Significance

Deep Throat characterized the hiring of Hunt and Liddy as the key to understanding the operation as one sponsored by John Mitchell and Charles Colson. He described both men as having disreputable reputations and said that Liddy wanted to tap The New York Times, an idea Mitchell liked. This was an assessment of responsibility and motive from an informed source, not a substitute for the documentary records. It frames the collaboration as an arrangement enabled by senior sponsors, while the travel records, Chenow’s account, and the staff members’ descriptions provide distinct evidence of the men’s operational proximity.

The relationship’s significance lies in the convergence of those different kinds of evidence. The false-name journeys show Hunt and Liddy moving together; the room 16 telephone places Hunt in a concealed communications arrangement that Liddy may also have used; and the wiretap accounts identify both as recipients of transcripts routed by Young. Together, these details connect the Plumbers’ leak investigations with the people and channels that would become central to the Watergate inquiry. They do not, on their own, assign every task or prove the precise content of every exchange. The collaboration emerges instead as a documented pattern of shared work and access, with its boundaries—and the question of who authorized particular acts—remaining part of the investigation’s larger problem.