Washington Post reports Dwight Chapin’s role as a sabotage contact
All the President's MenThe Washington Post’s report naming Dwight Chapin as a contact in Donald Segretti’s spying and sabotage operation brought the Watergate investigation into the White House’s inner circle. Its significance lay not only in identifying Richard Nixon’s appointments secretary, but in showing how the reporters tested a consequential allegation, distinguished what they could establish from what they could only suspect, and published a narrower account than some competing reports.## Silence, pressure, and the search for a source The report grew out of a wider effort to understand the Nixon campaign organization from fragments. The Washington Post’s reporters studied the Committee for the Re-election of the President roster, using job titles, floor locations, and telephone extensions to infer who worked near whom and who reported to whom. In mid-August, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward began visiting committee employees at home after the paper’s first-edition deadline. These were uncertain approaches: one employee trembled and pleaded with Bernstein to leave before others saw him; another began to cry while saying that she wanted to help. The encounters conveyed the pressure surrounding the inquiry, but they did not by themselves establish who had organized the political operation. Other sources described a climate of silence and possible concealment. The committee bookkeeper told Bernstein that people had already lied to the grand jury, and that Sally Harmony and others had lied, though she did not specify what they had concealed. Hugh Sloan, who had left the campaign treasurer’s post, told Bernstein that matters were worse than the public account suggested and that he had left because he suspected the worst. Sloan also described the unspoken instruction to “Hold ranks,” or “Keep the ship together”; he agreed that this could reasonably be understood as an instruction to lie. These accounts helped define the reporting problem, but did not identify Chapin as Segretti’s contact. The reporters were also careful about the limits of official records. An FBI agent told Bernstein that some people believed the reporters had access to the Bureau’s Form 302 interview reports. Bernstein understood that such reports were raw accounts, not evaluated or substantiated findings: they could contain facts, hearsay, suspicions, or grievances. A 302 could not responsibly serve as the sole basis for a story. That distinction mattered as the reporters sought a source who could speak directly to Segretti’s dealings rather than repeat untested allegations.## Establishing the Chapin connection Larry Young, a California attorney who had spoken with Segretti, became that source. On Friday, October 13, Young agreed to speak on the record. Bob Woodward reviewed the details with him again, specifically testing whether Young might be mistaken or exaggerating about Segretti’s dealings with Chapin and E. Howard Hunt. Young said he was not. Robert Meyers was then sent to obtain Young’s sworn statement affirming that the interviews with Meyers, Bernstein, and Woodward accurately represented what Segretti had told him. The verification and affidavit gave the reporters an evidentiary basis they could identify publicly, rather than relying on anonymous government sources. The reporting concerned a relationship that reached close to the President. A White House acquaintance described Chapin as a longtime Nixon loyalist who had followed Richard Nixon through successive political campaigns and was personally attentive to the practical details around him. The story’s central claim was more specific: a California attorney’s sworn statement said that Chapin and a former White House aide indicted in the Watergate bugging case had both served as contacts in a spying and sabotage operation against Democrats. The article’s lead made Chapin’s official position central, presenting him as the President’s appointments secretary, not merely as a campaign functionary. Young’s account also described the money behind Segretti’s work. The draft said that payments, including an annual salary of $20,000, came from a trust account in a lawyer’s name, described as belonging to a highly placed friend of the President. Segretti, Young said, had been instructed to guard that name zealously. The report did not identify the lawyer. That omission was deliberate: although Herbert Kalmbach seemed to fit Young’s description, the reporters had not established his connection to Segretti with a sufficiently specific source.## The editing decision Bernstein completed a draft for Sunday publication, and Bob Woodward and Barry Sussman joined him at the office on Saturday morning to review it. Sussman thought the opening did not sufficiently convey Chapin’s standing in the White House. He added that Chapin, then 31, met almost daily with Richard Nixon, managed the President’s schedule and appointments, coordinated trips, and belonged to the small group of staff members with easy access to him. Bernstein welcomed the change: the reported connection would mean something different to readers if they understood the access and authority attached to Chapin’s job. The review also narrowed what the paper was willing to claim. Bernstein objected when editors removed a paragraph describing Chapin as someone who responded to orders from H. R. Haldeman. He was more anguished when they cut the passage suggesting that Young’s description of Segretti’s paymaster fit Kalmbach, Richard Nixon’s personal attorney and a former deputy finance chairman of the campaign. Woodward supported holding back the Kalmbach identification until the paper could contact him or obtain a source who specifically named him as the paymaster. Bernstein accepted that they should be able to confirm Kalmbach’s role soon, but expectation was not yet evidence. The published story retained the account of the trust fund while protecting the unverified identity behind it. The final headline was “Key Nixon Aide Named as ‘Sabotage’ Contact.” The story’s wording reflected the distinction between what Young’s sworn statement supported and what remained unresolved: Chapin was named as a contact; the lawyer said to have financed Segretti was not. The restraint did not make the allegation inconsequential. It made the published claim more precise.## Denial and competing accounts The Washington Post sought comment from the White House before publication. After the decision to hold the story for Sunday, deputy press secretary Gerald Warren called back at about 8:00 P.M. on Friday with a statement from Chapin. Chapin characterized the article as based on hearsay and fundamentally inaccurate. He said he did not know, had never met, seen, or spoken with Hunt; acknowledged knowing Segretti since their college days; denied meeting him in Florida as the story suggested; and denied discussing any phase of the Watergate grand-jury proceedings with him. He said he had no further comment. The denial answered several charges Chapin raised, but not the article’s principal assertion that he had been Segretti’s contact. The Washington Post also had Young’s sworn statement, so the allegation was not, as Chapin’s response implied, based only on uncorroborated hearsay. The dispute was therefore both about the underlying relationship and about how the public should judge the sources behind the reporting. The Sunday story was reviewed by Harry Rosenfeld, Howard Simons, and Ben Bradlee, and it broke new ground almost four months after the break-in at Democratic headquarters: the expanding Watergate scandal had, in the book’s account, finally reached into the White House. On Sunday, radio reports carried the article alongside a Time magazine release about the Segretti–Chapin connection. Time’s account relied on anonymous government sources and lacked Young’s personal account, but added claims the Post had not published: that Chapin had hired Segretti, that Gordon Strachan had also helped hire him, and that Kalmbach had paid Segretti more than $35,000. The contrast underscored the Post’s decision to publish what its on-record evidence supported while reserving further identifications for later confirmation.