Paul McHugh
How to Change Your MindPaul McHugh appears as a prominent psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins University and as a sharp critic of psychedelic experience. His importance in the account lies in the challenge he poses to Griffiths’s interpretation: whether the vivid, disorienting effects reported by volunteers should be understood as meaningful experiences or as a form of toxic delirium.
Identity and Intervention
McHugh enters the narrative through a conversation between Griffiths and the author over breakfast on the sunporch of Griffiths’s modest ranch house in suburban Baltimore. Griffiths identifies him as a colleague at Johns Hopkins University who dismisses psychedelic experience as nothing more than toxic delirium, then encourages the author to look up McHugh’s published argument.
The intervention is not a direct encounter between McHugh and the author. Instead, his position arrives through a review in Commentary of a book about the Harvard Psilocybin Project. That route makes McHugh a recalled but consequential presence: his clinical interpretation is set against the reports Griffiths has been gathering from psychedelic-study volunteers.
The Delirium Argument
McHugh compares psychedelic effects to a strange and colorful state of mind that doctors encounter in patients with advanced hepatic, renal, or pulmonary disease. In those cases, he writes, toxic products accumulate in the body and affect the brain and mind in ways comparable to LSD. His list of similarities is specific: vivid color perception, the merging of physical sensations, hallucinations, disorientation, loss of a sense of time, and delusional joys and terrors that can bring unpredictable feelings and behavior.
The force of the comparison is classificatory. McHugh places psychedelic experience alongside symptoms that medical practitioners are called upon to treat in seriously ill patients, rather than accepting the volunteers’ descriptions as evidence of a distinct or authoritative spiritual state. The account gives no fuller biography or wider explanation of his views; his role here is concentrated in this skeptical reading of the experience.
Griffiths’s Counterargument and Significance
Griffiths does not rule out the possibility that the volunteers’ experiences might amount to temporary psychosis. He plans to test for delirium in an upcoming experiment, leaving the medical question open to investigation. But he doubts that the diagnosis captures what is happening: patients suffering from delirium generally find it deeply unpleasant, whereas his volunteers may look back months later and describe the experience as among the most meaningful of their lives.
McHugh’s argument therefore sharpens the account’s central distinction between resemblance and interpretation. The experiences may share perceptual and cognitive features with delirium, yet Griffiths points to their remembered meaning and lasting significance as facts the comparison must also explain. McHugh is not shown revising or defending his position; the narrative leaves the disagreement unresolved, presenting it as a dispute about what clinical similarity can establish and what remains to be learned from the people who undergo these states.

