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Stanford Research Institute

How to Change Your Mind

Stanford Research Institute was a prestigious think tank affiliated with Stanford University and a recipient of federal contracts, including military work. In 1968, it became the setting for an ambiguous new phase of Al Hubbard’s psychedelic activity. He was hired under the title of part-time special investigative agent, ostensibly to investigate student drug use; accounts from Willis Harman and a former SRI employee indicate that his actual work included running LSD sessions. The institute thus stood at the juncture of educational policy, government connections, and a psychedelic program that had become more discreet after LSD was made illegal.

Institution and Setting

Harman had joined SRI after the International Foundation for Advanced Study, which he had established with Myron Stolaroff, closed in 1966. At SRI he led the Educational Policy Research Center, whose mandate was to envision the future of education. The institute’s government contracts gave it a formal connection to federal agencies, while its location amid the Stanford community placed it within reach of engineers and academics who continued to use LSD despite its new illegal status.

That combination made SRI different from the earlier research foundation. The work now sat inside a government-contracted think tank rather than an organization openly dedicated to studying LSD’s effects on personality and creativity. The institute’s educational remit also provided an official rationale for examining student movements and their possible influence on the future of education. Against this institutional background, Hubbard’s new job could be presented as policy-related investigation even as psychedelic sessions apparently continued.

Hubbard’s Appointment and Public Role

By 1968 Hubbard was broke and had been called back from semiretirement by Harman. Harman’s employment letter described concern that drug use among members of the student New Left might be deliberate and politically consequential. It proposed that Hubbard work as an investigator able to access information not ordinarily available. The letter framed his assignment as an inquiry into social movements affecting education and their implications for long-range educational policy.

Hubbard’s services to SRI also included using his extensive government contacts to help keep contracts flowing. He resumed work in a khaki security-guard uniform, with a gold badge, sidearm, and belt studded with bullets. The uniform and investigative title presented a conspicuous security role, but the account distinguishes that public appearance from the work Harman said Hubbard actually performed. Hubbard may have investigated illegal drug use on campus, as his public stance against the counterculture would have made plausible; the evidence does not establish that he did so for SRI or for another party.

Sessions Behind the Cover

The reported private purpose of Hubbard’s SRI work was to run special sessions. Harman later told Todd Brendan Fahey that Hubbard had done nothing resembling security work; a former SRI employee independently confirmed that the job was to conduct special sessions. The stated mission associated with Hubbard and Harman—to provide LSD experiences to political and intellectual leaders around the world—had apparently survived the legal change, though it now operated more quietly and beneath a cover story.

This arrangement echoed Hubbard’s earlier role as a traveling intermediary among psychedelic researchers. In the 1950s he had carried LSD, treatment techniques, and clinical expertise between research centers; in Menlo Park he had guided members of the group around Stolaroff and Harman and trained them to guide others. The move to SRI did not erase that networked model. Instead, it placed its practice in a new institutional setting, where an official assignment to assess drug use could coexist with sessions intended to bring psychedelic experiences to influential people. The precise scope, participants, and duration of those SRI sessions are not specified.

Evidence and Institutional Ambiguity

A retrospective account by Peter Schwartz, an engineer who began working for Harman at SRI in 1973, preserves the traces Hubbard left in the institute. Schwartz was given Hubbard’s former office. Above the desk hung a large photograph of Richard Nixon inscribed to Hubbard in recognition of his years of service; letters addressed to A. M. Hubbard had accumulated in the in-box, including one from George Bush, then head of the Republican National Committee and later CIA director. These objects documented Hubbard’s government-facing connections without clarifying the nature of his SRI duties.

Schwartz recalled Hubbard appearing to retrieve his mail in the security uniform, carrying a .38, and asking him questions about human origins and the cosmos. He later learned that Hubbard used such questions to assess whether someone might be a suitable candidate. The recollection gives the episode an intimate, selective dimension: behind the official investigator’s appearance, Hubbard was evaluating people for a different kind of work. It remains retrospective testimony rather than a full institutional record, and the SRI evidence leaves the boundaries between investigation, government networking, and psychedelic practice unresolved.

SRI’s significance in this account lies less in a documented formal psychedelic program than in the overlap its setting made possible. The institute’s policy mandate and federal ties supplied an official frame; Harman’s leadership and Hubbard’s appointment connected that frame to continuing sessions. The discrepancy between Hubbard’s ostensible security duties and his reported actual work makes SRI a particularly clear example of how psychedelic activity persisted by shifting from public research institutions toward less visible arrangements.