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Lance Maerov

She Said

Lance Maerov was an independent director of The Weinstein Company whose attempts to scrutinize Harvey Weinstein became a measure of the distance between corporate oversight and protection for employees. Appointed as a watchdog for investors, he encountered evidence of complaints and settlements but largely assessed them through the question of liability to the company. Years later, when Megan Twohey reported that The New York Times was preparing an investigation, Maerov helped establish what the board had known—and then faced renewed pressure from Weinstein to intervene.

A Watchdog with a Limited Mandate

Maerov joined the board in 2013 as one of three independent directors. His appointment reflected the expectations of his employer, the advertising company WPP, Goldman Sachs, and other major investors: he was supposed to help ensure that Harvey and Bob Weinstein did not mistreat shareholders. The board itself was dominated by wealthy men from finance and entertainment, most of whom took a hands-off approach. Maerov understood his role as keeping the brothers honest, but his initial attention was directed toward financial misconduct and the company’s broader dysfunction rather than the treatment of women.

He had heard rumors that Harvey Weinstein put friends into films and noticed that young women often accompanied the producer at screenings and other events. Maerov interpreted this as extramarital infidelity, not as evidence of harassment. His picture of the company’s dysfunction came instead from the bitter verbal confrontations between the brothers, which he regarded as a recurring governance problem. When an accusation of groping became public in 2015, however, he began to worry that Weinstein’s conduct might form a pattern and create liability for the company. That concern made the upcoming contract renewal an opportunity to force a closer examination.

The File and the Contract

As a director involved in renewing Weinstein’s contract, Maerov could have examined his personnel file. Weinstein refused to let him see it, with David Boies supporting the refusal and offering to review the file himself and report any potential legal problems. Maerov distrusted this arrangement: Boies sometimes represented the company and sometimes Weinstein, creating an apparent conflict over information that might be damaging to his client. Yet the dispute over access did not produce an independent review for Maerov.

On July 1, 2015, Irwin Reiter and two other executives met Maerov for breakfast at the Four Seasons Hotel in Beverly Hills. Reiter discreetly showed him several pages, including the memo concerning Emily Nestor, as well as information about complaints of verbal abuse. The executives were wary of allowing him to leave with the documents, so Maerov read them at the table. He had finally seen material bearing on the conduct he suspected, but the glimpse did not lead him to pursue the memo forcefully. He later characterized it as a poor copy and noted that it had come through colleagues rather than directly from Nestor.

Maerov also knew that Weinstein had paid settlements to women. Boies emphasized that company money had not been used, and Maerov did not press for details. During contract negotiations, Weinstein agreed to a code of conduct and a system of escalating financial penalties if settlements resulted from his misconduct: $250,000 for the first, $500,000 for the second, and increases up to $1 million. The contract also permitted termination for misconduct. These provisions could impose costs on Weinstein and protect the company, but they did not by themselves establish that the company would prevent harm or make complaints visible. Maerov’s own priority was to limit corporate liability. Once he believed the company had secured legal and financial safeguards, he considered his work sufficient.

The arrangement coexisted with the failure of a broader effort to restrain Weinstein. Maerov, Reiter, and Bob Weinstein each felt the situation could not continue, but they were not acting in concert: Bob regarded Maerov as a threat to his power. Weinstein ultimately signed a new contract in October 2015 that preserved his authority for years. Bob accepted a private promise that his brother would continue intensive therapy for sex addiction, rather than a written and enforceable requirement. Reiter, who had tried to help separate Weinstein from the company and had risked sharing the Nestor memo, remained at work but declined an offer to return full time at a higher salary.

What the Board Knew

In 2017, as the Times investigation approached publication, Twohey called Maerov at his Park Avenue office and read him an excerpt from Lauren O’Connor’s memo. Asked what he had done about it, he agreed to meet her later that day in Bryant Park. Maerov said he had been concerned about Weinstein’s treatment of women, particularly after the New York Police Department investigation. He described the board’s response to the investigation and said it had approved a code of conduct intended to curb misconduct.

He also explained that, after the board learned of O’Connor’s memo, he wanted an outside lawyer to investigate. Within a day or two, Boies told him that the complaint had been withdrawn; Maerov accepted that explanation and let the matter go. His account gave Twohey evidence that the board had known of claims about Weinstein and, beyond adopting a written code, had largely looked away. Maerov agreed to be quoted, but said he needed to inform the other directors. Twohey asked him not to do so over the weekend, because Weinstein might use the warning to intensify efforts to block the article. Maerov agreed to give the reporters two days.

Pressure and Refusal

Maerov broke that promise as soon as he returned to his desk. He called Bob Weinstein and company president David Glasser and relayed what Twohey had told him. By the following morning, Harvey Weinstein also knew details of the impending story. Weinstein asked Maerov to help kill it, appealing to their past disagreements and asking him to act on his behalf. When Maerov balked, Weinstein threatened to use a personal letter Maerov had written years earlier to Stephanie Seymour. Maerov refused, maintaining that his responsibility was to safeguard the company, not its producer.

The pressure returned during an emergency call with Boies and the board on the night of October 3, 2017. Maerov had insisted on the meeting because he was outraged that Weinstein had hired lawyers to handle the coming story without the board’s knowledge. Boies told the directors the Times article would be damaging and described eight to twelve settlements, while acknowledging the number might be higher. The discussion centered on how the company should respond and whether it could present a unified front. The scene recalled the earlier contract negotiations: the board was confronted with evidence of repeated settlements, but its attention still gravitated toward institutional exposure and strategy.

Maerov’s part in the story remains divided between intervention and accommodation. He sought access to information, received a revealing document, and later described the board’s awareness to a reporter. But he did not press for the details of settlements, accepted the withdrawal explanation about O’Connor’s complaint, and treated financial penalties and legal protection as an adequate response. His eventual refusal to help suppress the investigation set a limit on Weinstein’s personal pressure; it did not undo the earlier failures of oversight. Through Maerov, the account shows how a director can recognize a serious risk and still define the duty narrowly—as protecting the organization from liability rather than ensuring that the people within it are protected.

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