The 1997 Indonesian National Everest Expedition was an attempt to climb Mount Everest by the Southeast Ridge, undertaken by a team whose members had limited experience on the world’s highest mountains. Anatoli Boukreev joined as lead climbing consultant, not as a guarantor of success: he insisted on control of summit-day decisions, argued for preparation and rescue capacity, and warned that the mountain could defeat even a skilled team. The expedition reached the summit, endured an emergency bivouac at Camp V, and brought all its members back without injury. Its achievement was inseparable from the risks Boukreev had tried to make explicit—and from his return to Everest to bury Scott Fischer and Yasuko Namba.

Formation and Terms of the Expedition

In Kathmandu in the fall of 1996, Boukreev was asked by his friend Ang Tshering Sherpa of Asian Trekking to consult for an Indonesian team planning a spring attempt on Everest’s Southeast Ridge. The mountain was the site of the previous year’s ordeal with Fischer, and Boukreev had unfinished personal business there: he hoped to give Fischer and Namba respectful burials. He also wanted a professional role consistent with his view of mountaineering as a sport, while earning a living in the growing commercial high-altitude climbing market.

When Boukreev met the expedition’s organizers in Kathmandu and then General Prabowo Subianto in Jakarta, he described success as uncertain rather than promised. He estimated a 30 percent chance that one individual would reach the summit and a fifty-fifty chance of losing someone on the mountain. He proposed a year of training on progressively higher peaks, but the proposal was initially rejected. Prabowo nevertheless agreed that the team would undertake training and conditioning before the expedition began.

Boukreev made the limits of his role part of the agreement. He would serve as coach, adviser, and rescue-team member, and would not guarantee a summit. He required absolute control over final summit-day decisions, including the authority to cancel an attempt if the climbers’ condition or mountain conditions made it unreasonably dangerous. He also stressed that a rescue team could not guarantee an effective rescue above 8,000 meters, though he was prepared to risk his life in that capacity. The planned winter preparation in Nepal was to test endurance and mental discipline in prolonged cold and wind, while acclimatizing the team to 6,000 meters.

Ascent and Summit Attempt

At midnight on April 22, three Russian climbers and six Indonesians left Base Camp. They moved directly to Camp II in six hours, rested there on April 23, and continued to Camp III the following day. Strong winds were reported above the South Col, but a weather report indicated they did not signal a serious change. The team stayed at Camp III, while the Sherpas descended to Camp II; Apa Sherpa was responsible for arranging the emergency camp for summit day. By April 25 the team had reached the South Col, where the Indonesian climbers appeared coherent, coordinated, and self-motivated.

The summit plan depended on oxygen, a high camp, and a route that still had to be prepared. Each Indonesian climber was to carry two oxygen bottles and use oxygen continuously at two liters per minute; Sherpas would carry three extra bottles per climber. The team also faced deep snow, in places two to three feet, and the labor of breaking trail and fixing ropes. On April 26, Boukreev left the South Col at midnight using oxygen at one liter per minute, went to the front, and broke trail rather than asking Sherpas carrying heavy loads to do the work. After nine hours of trudging through thigh-deep snow, he reached the South Summit fatigued. Apa fixed a steep section of line, but the team discovered it had no more rope for the route. Apa improvised with the remaining forty meters and old rope exposed along the route, allowing the ascent to continue.

The team learned that a tent and extra oxygen had been placed at 8,500 meters, and Apa had pieced a line up to the Hillary Step. A little after 12:30 p.m., despite the late hour, Boukreev, Bashkirov, and Vinogradski decided to continue toward the summit. The Indonesian climbers were not equally strong: Misirin was slow but functioning independently, Asmujiono was moving well but seemed mentally withdrawn, and Iwan’s coordination was beginning to falter. Boukreev wanted to continue with only one Indonesian climber and turn the others back, but agreed to postpone that decision until above the Hillary Step. He assigned Vinogradski to monitor Asmujiono.

On the ridge, Iwan moved slowly and fell, stopping himself on old fixed rope. Boukreev showed him how to use his ice ax; he realized that Iwan had not seen snow until four months earlier. Near the summit, Boukreev advised Iwan and Asmujiono to stop and descend, but they refused. At about 3 p.m., roughly thirty meters below the summit, he again warned Apa and Dawa that the two men were deteriorating and that the team needed to descend soon. Misirin collapsed in the snow near the summit. Asmujiono then pushed on to the summit, embraced the official tripod of flags and poles, changed his hat for his army beret, and unfurled Indonesia’s flag. Boukreev photographed him; the team spent only ten minutes at the summit. He ordered everyone down before Vinogradski, who was approaching, could arrive.

Camp V and the Descent

The descent tested whether the summit would remain a success. At the South Summit, Misirin fell several times but got up and continued. Iwan, using Vinogradski’s oxygen, had disconnected from the rope and fell at a junction of fixed lines; Vinogradski pulled him back onto the rope. Boukreev led the group with a headlamp through the twilight. The Indonesian climbers reached Camp V at 7:30 p.m.; Bashkirov and Vinogradski arrived about an hour later.

Camp V was far less secure than planned. Its tent lacked two sections of poles and functioned more like a large bivouac sack. It contained a stove, pots, gas, a Karrimat, and two full oxygen bottles. Six people sheltered inside as the temperature fell. Apa and Dawa had accompanied the team, but Apa wanted to descend with Dawa; Boukreev permitted them to go, arranging radio contact for the morning.

During the night, Vinogradski repeatedly heated water while Boukreev and Bashkirov took turns changing the oxygen mask among the three exhausted Indonesian summiters. The two bottles had to be shared through the night. The climbers worked in rotation, and Boukreev attributed their survival to working together. At dawn the weather was calm. The team had run out of oxygen, but the Indonesians were moving, and no one had frostbite. After a final round of hot water, they began descending, with the understanding that the summit would count as a true success only when everyone reached Base Camp.

Return, Burial, and Meaning

Once the team’s condition seemed stable, Boukreev turned to his other purpose on the mountain. Near 8,400 meters he searched for Fischer, whom the team had passed close to in darkness on the ascent. He found Fischer almost completely covered by snow, and, with Vinogradski’s help, covered the body with snow and rocks. They marked the place with an ice-ax shaft. Boukreev had carried a farewell flag from Fischer’s wife and friends, but had left it at the summit when he was uncertain he could complete the burial. The flag remained flying there as he fulfilled the commitment on the descent.

On April 28, Boukreev went to the edge near the Kangshung Face, where he had left Namba during the previous year’s storm. He found her partially covered by snow and ice, collected small items scattered around her for her family, and covered her body with stones. He left two ice axes as markers. He described these gestures as the limited respect he could offer Fischer’s and Namba’s families.

The Indonesian team and its support climbers descended safely. Boukreev acknowledged that many people contributed and that luck mattered; he also distinguished the expedition’s ending from the previous year’s loss, saying this success did not burn in his heart. The contrast did not make him comfortable with the commercial system that had brought inexperienced climbers to Everest. He remained troubled by the willingness of the Indonesian climbers to accept death as a possible price of the summit, and maintained that each climber must bear responsibility for personal ambition. The expedition thus achieved its stated goal without resolving the ethical tension at its center: experience and rescue preparation could improve the odds, but could not promise safety or summit success.