The Principle of Nobility by Virtue

The Principle of Nobility by Virtue defines true nobility as a quality shown in conduct, not inherited through birth or secured by wealth. Its clearest formulation comes when Ghismonda defends her love for Guiscardo: all people share a common origin, she argues, and those who make the greatest use of their equal capacities and virtues earn the name of noble. The argument turns a dispute about her lover’s low condition into a judgment of the aristocratic order itself.

The Measure of Nobility

Ghismonda begins from human equality. Everyone receives flesh from the same stock, and every soul is created by one Creator with equal faculties, powers, and virtues. The first distinction between noble and non-noble therefore arose not from birth, but from the different degree to which people possessed and exercised those qualities. Custom later obscured this original principle, but, she insists, did not erase it from nature or good conduct.

On this account, nobility is not a title that can simply be claimed. A person manifests gentility by acting worthily; the person who denies that worth on the basis of status reveals a failing of judgment. The principle makes conduct the evidence and inherited position only a claim to be tested against it.

Ghismonda’s Defense of Guiscardo

The principle takes shape in Ghismonda’s reply to Tancred, who condemns her for choosing a man of low condition. She distinguishes the supposed fault of loving from the social prejudice that makes her choice seem blameworthy. Her love was deliberate: she chose Guiscardo after considered judgment, and both lovers sustained it through perseverance and discretion. She rejects the assumption that a woman of noble birth must choose a man of gentle birth to preserve her own honor.

Ghismonda’s case rests not on a vague assertion of affection, but on evidence already available to Tancred. She reminds him that he himself praised Guiscardo for the qualities by which a worthy man should be commended. Her own eyes, she says, confirmed those praises in Guiscardo’s actions, which surpassed even Tancred’s words. If Tancred calls Guiscardo ignoble, then his judgment conflicts with the virtues he had previously recognized in the man.

The argument also reverses the direction of blame. If Guiscardo is poor, Ghismonda allows, that condition may be acknowledged; but poverty does not take away gentility. Rather, his poverty reflects shamefully on Tancred, who failed to provide for a servant he had recognized as a man of worth. Social dependence, in her account, does not cancel merit; it can expose the responsibility of those who possess the power to reward it.

Wealth, Rank, and Worth

Ghismonda draws a firm distinction between poverty and ignobility. Wealth cannot supply virtue, and lack of wealth cannot extinguish it. She recalls that kings and great princes were once poor, while people who now dig or tend sheep were once rich. Fortune changes material circumstances; it does not establish a person’s moral value. The argument does not deny that social ranks exist, but denies that rank reliably identifies the worth it claims to signify.

Her challenge is especially pointed because Tancred has already supplied the evidence against his own accusation. He has praised Guiscardo’s qualities, and Guiscardo has made those qualities visible in deeds. The principle thus asks for a consistent standard: the virtues praised in a socially elevated person must count when they appear in someone poor or dependent as well.

Conduct Against Reputation

Other episodes in the collection sharpen the distinction between public standing and demonstrated character without restating Ghismonda’s argument as a formal rule. Guglielmo Borsiere answers Ermino de' Grimaldi’s request for an unprecedented image by recommending Liberality, a quality the miser has not displayed. Ermino is shamed into changing his conduct and becomes known for generosity and hospitality. The episode makes character visible through action: a fine house and social position do not amount to liberality, while changed behavior can give the virtue substance.

In another public exchange, Nonna de' Pulci answers Antonio d'Orso after he points her out to Dego della Ratta with a remark that threatens her honor. Her sharp retort exposes the shame surrounding the marshal’s treatment of a married woman and leaves both men silent. The story’s framing values not rank alone but the judgment and timing of a response: a woman’s wit can answer the presumptions of men who possess greater social power.

The same interest in the difference between appearance and quality appears in the tale of Fra Alberto. Although he is regarded as good, he behaves as a knave, impersonating the angel Gabriel to deceive Lisetta; once recognized, he is publicly abused and carried back to the convent, where he is believed to die in prison. His clerical standing cannot make his conduct virtuous. These episodes are not identical to Ghismonda’s account of nobility, but they reinforce its central demand that reputation be measured against what a person does.

The Principle’s Reach

Ghismonda’s reasoning is both ethical and personal. It gives a general account of nobility, then applies that account to her own choice and to Tancred’s contradictory judgments. Its force comes from the standards it requires him to honor: deeds over lineage, virtue over wealth, and consistent judgment over inherited prejudice. The principle does not promise that society will immediately treat merit fairly; Guiscardo remains vulnerable to Tancred’s power. Instead, it exposes the moral inadequacy of treating social rank as proof of human worth.