Keeling’s engagement with a surfaced U-boat near Cadena

Keeling’s engagement with a surfaced U-boat near Cadena turns a fleeting radar contact into a sudden gun attack, then into a test of when to stop fighting. Krause tracks the submarine as it moves around Cadena and closes toward the rescue ship, but poor visibility and uncertain radar returns leave him choosing among imperfect options. Keeling fires at the surfaced boat and scores no observed hit. Krause nevertheless judges that the encounter has bought time: the submarine has gone under, while the convoy’s other escorts need his support more urgently than a speculative search does.

The escort screen and the cost of pursuit

The engagement unfolds within a wider problem of convoy defense. A radar contact does not by itself establish that a U-boat is present, and pursuing one can weaken the screen protecting the whole convoy. With only four fighting ships available, detaching one or two risks opening gaps through which other submarines might pass. Fuel is another constraint: a ship sent far from the convoy may spend hours searching, then have to steam hard to rejoin, consuming part of a reserve that Krause’s training has taught him to preserve for a crisis. Yet leaving a real U-boat undisturbed could allow it to report the convoy’s position by radio, track its speed and course, or help bring a wolf-pack to attack. The decision is not simply whether a contact can be chased, but whether any likely gain justifies the cost to the larger defense.

Krause also manages the crew’s endurance rather than treating readiness as limitless. Keeling is already in Condition Two, with battle stations largely manned and watertight integrity maintained. Calling general quarters would summon every sailor to a battle post, interrupt routine work, and leave men hungry and tired; unlike Condition Two, battle stations could not be sustained for long. Repeated alarms without clear necessity could also make men slack in responding. Krause therefore refuses to sound the general alarm merely because James and Viktor are pursuing a contact away from the convoy. Later, after a day of contact with the enemy, he cancels the routine general-quarters call for the watch, allowing the men below a full four hours of rest unless an emergency intervenes. The engagement takes place inside this continuing calculation of ships, fuel, time, and human capacity.

Radar reports and the approach to Cadena

The first reported radar returns place two pips bearing 091, ten miles away, nearly in the convoy’s track. They look like submarines, but that report does not establish that both contacts are involved in the later encounter near Cadena. Keeling’s radar gives Krause a means of following activity through the murk, though its definition frustrates him; he calls for Lieutenant Rudel to report in the hope of improving the picture. The equipment supplies bearings and ranges, not certainty about what the contacts intend.

A later pip is reported bearing 207 at a range of eleven thousand yards, well abaft Keeling’s starboard beam. Krause identifies it as the U-boat he had been screening from Cadena. It appears to have surfaced as it fell behind. He considers whether to turn end-on and attack, but first tests the possibility that the contact is a ruse meant to draw Keeling away. With no earlier pips in that sector, he decides that any submarines present are unlikely to have coordinated such a plan. He orders Keeling onto course 207 and has gunnery control prepare to fire on radar direction.

As the reported bearing shifts through 209 and approximately 210, the range closes to 10,400 yards. Krause plots the relative movements: the submarine is making an end-around, moving from Cadena’s starboard quarter toward her port quarter. In the rough sea it is unlikely to manage more than twelve knots, perhaps fourteen; it is nearly six miles astern of Cadena, which is making eleven and a half knots, and ten miles astern of the convoy. For the moment, it is out of immediate reach. Krause turns Keeling to course 220, describing his purpose to Charlie Cole as leading the submarine rather than simply following its track.

The range continues to close. When Charlie Cole reports bearings changing rapidly through 205 and 203, with ranges of 9,300 and 9,200 yards, Krause judges that the U-boat has turned to starboard and is now in a position to approach Cadena. Keeling turns onto course 180. The crew prepares to engage, while the submarine remains hidden by the poor visibility and the movement of the sea.

The gun attack

At a reported range of 8,300 yards, the submarine is less than five miles away. A lookout calls out; Krause has his glasses in his numbed hands but has not yet trained them in the right direction. The guns open fire, and the splashes of the shells lead him to the target: a small, square grey bridge visible in the distance. Water columns rise around it, briefly obscuring the boat. Krause sees the salvoes fall about the submarine, but he does not see the flash or momentary glow that would show a hit.

Gunnery control reports that fire opened at a range of eight thousand yards and that twenty-seven rounds were fired, with no hits observed. Krause acknowledges the report without claiming a success the evidence cannot confirm. The attack has caught the surfaced submarine by surprise, but the immediate result remains uncertain: the boat disappears beneath the water, and neither a damaging hit nor a kill is established.

Breaking off and the meaning of the encounter

Krause’s next decision is whether to turn back toward the spot where the submarine vanished and conduct a sonar search. Keeling could reach the area in about fifteen minutes, but the odds of making another contact are poor, and the convoy would continue to draw away during an hour-long search. Ahead, the other three escort ships are about to enter a fight against heavy odds. Krause orders Keeling onto course 100, turning away from the submarine and toward the more urgent action.

The choice is deliberately not presented as proof that the U-boat has been destroyed. Krause allows for the possibility of an unobserved hit, but judges that even damage to a submarine’s superstructure might not prevent it from diving effectively. The boat is already far behind the convoy; after going under, it may wait a long time before surfacing again, and would then need much of the approaching night to catch up, even if it knew the convoy’s exact position, speed, and course. Krause’s immediate achievement is therefore limited but real in his assessment: he has made the submarine withdraw below the surface and rendered it less useful to the attack for some hours. Rather than risk the escort’s larger purpose for an unlikely follow-up success, he chooses the certain need ahead of him over the uncertain target astern.