United States Army Medical Research and Development Command

The United States Army Medical Research and Development Command enters the account of the Reston outbreak as the authority above the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and the command that enabled the Army to intervene. Its importance lay not in laboratory diagnosis or hands-on work at the monkey house, but in turning a frightening finding into an organized federal operation: a decision that required leadership, resources, and action amid unresolved questions of jurisdiction and liability.

Command Authority and the Emerging Threat

When tests at the institute indicated that monkeys near Washington might carry Ebola Zaire, Colonel David Huxsoll brought the finding to Major General Philip K. Russell, commander of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command. Russell had authority over the institute, and the report placed the possibility of a dangerous outbreak before the senior command. The evidence included photographs of the virus and positive test results; the question was no longer only what the agent was, but what the Army should do about it.

The available choices were stark. The monkeys could be isolated and the outbreak allowed to run its course, while people who had handled them were monitored and possibly quarantined; or the animals could be killed and the facility disinfected in a major biohazard operation. Nancy Jaax warned that Ebola could cross species and questioned the safety and humanity of waiting for the animals to die. She also proposed inspecting the monkeys and their tissues for signs that could further confirm infection. The command’s response had to weigh the uncertain course of the outbreak against the consequences of either intervention.

Capability, Jurisdiction, and the Decision to Act

The meeting exposed a divide between legal mandate and practical capacity. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had the federal mandate to control human disease, while the Army was not clearly assigned responsibility for fighting a virus on American soil. Yet the institute had expertise and equipment the public-health agency did not. Russell recognized that deploying the Army could provoke a jurisdictional dispute, but judged the threat too urgent to leave unresolved by institutional boundaries.

The response also needed to be built from scratch. The Army had not previously organized a major field operation against a hot virus; personnel, legal questions, and funding all remained to be settled. Russell pressed for a team-based operation, secured the commitment to obtain money, and designated C. J. Peters as team leader. He also called for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to be informed promptly, specifically so that its leadership would not be blindsided. The command thus supplied a chain of authority and a decision point, while specialist personnel at the institute would have to translate that decision into procedures and field action.

From Authorization to Field Operation

The command’s authority became consequential as Hazleton Washington’s Dan Dalgard sought to hand the monkey facility over to the Army. After two employees became ill, Dalgard recommended evacuation and transfer, believing the Army had the personnel and equipment to handle the danger. C. J. Peters was wary of wording that might make the Army legally responsible if something went wrong. He initially said he needed to clear the matter with his command rather than accept the transfer outright.

The negotiations sharpened when Hazleton managers requested that the Army assume liability after taking over the building. Peters rejected that condition. Dalgard then agreed to send a simpler letter transferring the monkey house, and Peters took it to Russell. Russell and Peters reviewed and signed it without submitting it to Army lawyers. The signed letter was faxed back to Dalgard, placing the facility in Army hands. The transfer settled who would control the building, but it did not erase the broader tension between urgent public protection, formal authority, and legal responsibility.

Once the transfer was secured, the operation proceeded through the institute’s personnel. Jerry Jaax, commanding officer of the 91-Tangos, assembled soldiers and civilian staff for the work. Gene Johnson had reconnoitered the facility and mapped a route through an empty storeroom and corridor, planning an insertion point that would keep the team and its equipment out of sight of television cameras. The response included an unmarked ambulance with a biocontainment stretcher and a supply van for animal remains and blood samples. The vehicles reached the monkey house during rush hour and were parked behind it, near a playground and day-care center. These details show how the command-level decision became a practical operation conducted in an ordinary office park, with the danger physically close to civilian surroundings.

Scope and Significance

The Army’s role continued beyond taking control. After the animals and building were dealt with, a decontamination team scrubbed the interior, sealed doors, windows, and vents, and used thirty-nine electric frying pans to release formaldehyde gas inside the facility. The gas remained for three days, reaching offices, equipment, and drains; the team then collected samples to check whether the treatment had worked. The account presents the sterilization as the close of an extraordinary response, not as proof that biological life can always be eliminated or its absence conclusively verified.

The United States Army Medical Research and Development Command is therefore associated with both a structural contradiction and a decisive intervention. It stood above an institute with capabilities the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lacked, while the statutory basis for Army action remained uncertain. Under Russell’s direction, that mismatch did not prevent the Army from organizing a response; command authority, personnel, transport, protective systems, and a negotiated transfer connected the diagnosis to containment. The episode makes clear that an emergency operation depends not only on recognizing a pathogen, but on deciding who may act, who will lead, and who will accept responsibility.