The French expedition to Scotland in 1385 was intended to pressure England from the north by joining a French force to the Scots and ravaging English territory. Its failure to secure effective cooperation or lasting gains left its participants far worse off than its scale and ambitions had promised. For Jean de Carrouges, who joined in search of wealth and advancement, the campaign brought the rank he had long sought—but also depleted resources, lost comrades, and a serious illness.

Strategic purpose and command

The expedition formed part of a wider effort to threaten England on two fronts. French forces sent to Scotland the previous year had burned and pillaged border districts, drawing Richard II and his troops north, away from London. A planned second invasion from the south was never launched, and the two-front strategy was abandoned. In 1385, Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, proposed a more ambitious invasion, urging Charles VI to win lasting renown by striking England with overwhelming force. The Scottish campaign thus had a strategic purpose beyond its own raids: it was meant to help divert English attention while France prepared a broader offensive.

The king commissioned the expedition, placing it under Sir Jean de Vienne, a celebrated commander and admiral of France since 1373. Vienne had reorganized the navy and coastal defenses, led naval raids against the English, helped defeat Charles the Bad in 1378, and commanded the Cotentin campaign in 1379, where Jean de Carrouges had served under him. The admiral’s experience linked the Scottish venture to a longer series of French military operations, while Carrouges’s earlier service gave him a personal connection to its commander.

Carrouges had recently reconciled with Jacques Le Gris, but the settlement had not erased his setbacks at Count Pierre of Alençon’s court. He chose to leave Normandy and seek advancement abroad. A display of courage might earn him a knighthood; plunder from English towns and castles might compensate for land and income he had lost at home. Before he could go, he had to obtain release from his regular military service. Count Pierre readily granted it after years of quarrels with his vassal. The permission freed Carrouges for the campaign, while also removing him temporarily from the count’s court. The account suggests that the count may have hoped Carrouges would not return: still without an heir, the knight risked leaving lands that could revert to his lord.

Mobilization and passage to Scotland

Vienne’s force included more than a thousand knights and squires, together with twice as many crossbowmen and armed servants, for a total of about three thousand men. Nobles came from across France. Carrouges joined with nine squires under his command, making his participation both a personal venture and a small unit within a much larger royal expedition.

The preparations reflected the intended scale and duration of the undertaking. In late April or early May, Carrouges and his men reached the port of Sluys, where nearly two hundred ships were being loaded with weapons, armor, primitive cannons, and supplies intended to support as much as a year of campaigning. Horses were carried for fighting, riding, and transporting baggage. The fleet also bore substantial gifts for the Scots: fifty suits of armor and 50,000 gold francs secured in chests. Before sailing, Vienne paid the army two months’ wages in advance. A muster on May 8 records Carrouges at Sluys with his nine squires and a payment of 320 livres, calculated at half a livre per man per day.

The fleet departed on May 20 in fair weather, sailing north along the Flemish coast before turning west for Scotland and the Firth of Forth. It put in at Leith, near Edinburgh. The French expected to join the Scots and march south together, but the reception exposed the limits of the alliance: Scots complained that they had not asked for the foreign army and could fight England themselves. King Robert also refused to march until he had received a large payment. Vienne accepted the demand because, without the king’s cooperation, the French had no effective allied force with which to proceed.

March, siege, and retreat

The combined French and Scottish army, about five thousand strong, finally left Edinburgh in early July. It crossed the Tweed and moved east toward the sea, burning farms and villages as it went. The force halted at Wark, where Castle Wark stood on a rocky outcrop above the river. The fortress was strongly defended: its four-storey keep had stone vaults and openings through which defenders could attack from above; ditches exposed assailants to fire from the walls; and Sir John Lussebourne had reinforced the garrison and installed heavy cannons. His household, including his wife and children, was inside.

Vienne sent a herald to demand the castle’s surrender. Lussebourne refused and warned the admiral against trusting the Scots. The assault began after this exchange. The campaign later included another unsuccessful attack: on September 7, French and Scottish troops brought ladders against a town’s walls but failed to take it by storm or destroy it. With the siege producing no decisive result, and the army deep in enemy territory, the invaders ended the attempt and turned north.

The withdrawal brought a further reversal. The retreating army, burdened by a large amount of plunder, was attacked at night by Sir Henry Percy, heir to the Earl of Northumberland and known as Hotspur for his speed and force on horseback. His attack killed many and put others to flight; twenty-six prominent prisoners were taken. Carrouges and Robert de Thibouville escaped capture and death, but the campaign’s muster on October 28 shows that Carrouges had lost five of the nine squires who had accompanied him. The record does not establish when or how all five were lost: some may have died in earlier fighting or from disease, while others may have fallen in Percy’s attack. The raid proved the campaign’s final battle.

Costs and outcome

As the season for fighting ended, Vienne’s battered force wintered in Edinburgh. The French could scarcely obtain provisions even when they had money to pay, and shortages of food and drink harmed both men and horses. The French eventually secured passage home and returned through Flanders or other available ports, hungry and without many of the arms and horses they had brought. Some returning soldiers were so poor that they could not remount themselves and resorted to riding work animals.

Carrouges returned to Normandy late in 1385 with his health and finances badly damaged. He had spent heavily to equip himself, expecting plunder in gold, silver, horses, and other valuables; instead, the expedition yielded no comparable return. He came home with a chronic fever, weakness, and recurring shakes and sweats. He had also spent more than six months abroad and lost five comrades. His wages remained in arrears, further underlining the gap between the promised opportunity and the campaign’s material result.

The one substantial personal prize was the knighthood he had hoped to win. A review of the French army in late October lists him as Sir Jean de Carrouges, knight, confirming that he had attained the rank during the campaign. Nearly fifty, he had so far failed to obtain this distinction at Count Pierre of Alençon’s court. His new status entitled him to be addressed as a chevalier and doubled his daily pay to one livre, although he had not yet collected all that was owed. The expedition therefore ended in a stark imbalance: Carrouges gained rank, but not the wealth that had motivated his departure, and returned to Normandy diminished in health and resources.

The campaign also preceded another unrealized invasion scheme. In 1386, Charles VI approved a proposal for a still larger assault on England and prepared to travel to Sluys to lead an armada of more than a thousand ships. He vowed not to return to Paris before setting foot on English soil, but that southern invasion was never launched. Set beside the Scottish expedition, the later plan underscores how the French strategy repeatedly reached the level of grand mobilization and royal commitment without producing the intended invasion of England.