Billy is found not guilty by reason of insanity

Billy is found not guilty by reason of insanity after a trial in which neither side called witnesses and the prosecution and defense submitted the case through stipulated evidence. Judge Jay Flowers dismissed the first count for lack of corroboration, then ruled that the agreed psychiatric evidence established Billy Milligan’s mental illness and its effect on his conduct at the time of the other charged acts. The decision resolved criminal responsibility on those counts while placing him under the authority of the probate court of Franklin County, leaving treatment and hospitalization as consequential questions rather than treating the verdict as a simple release.

Background: Capacity and Responsibility

The legal dispute had begun with a question distinct from whether Billy was responsible for the charged conduct: whether he could understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense. His public defenders, Gary Schweickart and Judy Stevenson, continued representing him after he sent them a letter firing them. The public defender’s office funded an evaluation by clinical psychologist Dr. Willis C. Driscoll, who administered tests on January 8 and 13, 1978. The tests produced an IQ score of 68, which Dr. Driscoll said was lowered by Billy’s depression; his report diagnosed acute schizophrenia and described serious difficulty distinguishing himself from his surroundings and understanding events. He recommended hospitalization for further examination and possible treatment.

On January 19, Schweickart and Stevenson presented Dr. Driscoll’s report to Judge Jay Flowers to support their claim that Billy could not assist in his defense. Flowers directed the forensic psychiatry unit at Southwest Community Mental Health Center to examine him. The order prompted a separate argument about the use of information Billy might disclose: Schweickart sought a guarantee that the examination would remain privileged, while prosecutors Sherman and Yavitch resisted. The eventual agreement allowed prosecutors to question Billy about incriminating statements from the examination only if he took the stand. The attorneys’ concern and the compromise addressed the fairness of the proceedings; they did not themselves determine Billy’s criminal responsibility at the time of the offenses.

A Stipulated-Evidence Trial

When the case reached the courtroom, Schweickart told the judge that both sides had agreed there was no need to call witnesses or put Billy on the stand. Instead, the facts would be read into the record as stipulations. The defense did not contest the charges or deny that Billy had committed the charged acts, apart from the first count, but pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution, represented by Yavitch, likewise agreed not to contest the findings presented by the psychiatrists from Southwest Community Mental Health Center and Harding Hospital concerning Billy’s mental condition when the crimes were committed.

The proceedings therefore turned on a defined legal question rather than a conventional contest of witness testimony. Judy Stevenson read the defense testimony, collected by deposition, into the record. The evidence included testimony concerning Billy’s home-life trauma, among it accounts of his mother’s abuse by Mr. Milligan and Billy’s response to it. As Stevenson read, she periodically looked toward Billy, whose face appeared pale to her. The scene placed the personal history described in the record beside the formal legal question, but the judgment itself rested on the stipulated medical evidence and the absence of evidence contradicting it.

The Court’s Findings

Before deciding the insanity defense, Judge Flowers dismissed the first count of rape. He cited the lack of corroborating evidence and the absence of a similar modus operandi. That dismissal was separate from the ruling on the other counts: it removed the first count on evidentiary grounds, rather than finding Billy not guilty by reason of insanity on that count.

For counts two through ten, the judge relied on the agreed medical testimony. The doctors testified that Billy was mentally ill at the time of the offenses and that, because of that illness, he could not distinguish right from wrong or refrain from the acts. With no evidence presented to the contrary, Flowers concluded that the court had no alternative but to find him not guilty by reason of insanity on those counts. The ruling thus connected a clinical account of Billy’s condition to the legally relevant questions of understanding and control; the diagnosis alone was not the stated basis of the decision.

Immediate Consequences

After the ruling, Judge Flowers placed Billy under the authority of the probate court of Franklin County and adjourned. The verdict therefore resolved the criminal case on the remaining counts without ending the state’s involvement in his care. Stevenson guided Billy toward the holding cell to avoid the crowd, while Dorothy Turner, Dr. Stella Karolin, and others came to congratulate him. The public defenders’ long effort had reached a decisive legal result, though the placement under probate authority meant that questions of treatment and custody remained.

The Verdict and Later Hospitalization

The case’s later procedural history underscores the distinction between an insanity acquittal and a finding that a person no longer needs hospital care. In December 1979, a court found Billy to be mentally ill, identified the condition as multiple personality, and ordered hospitalization. Its findings cited threats of suicide, recent violent behavior, and the need for treatment. This later determination did not reverse the earlier verdict. Rather, it addressed a different decision: whether Billy’s condition and risks required hospitalization after the criminal court had found him not guilty by reason of insanity on counts two through ten.

The verdict’s significance lies in both its scope and its limits. It accepted the medical evidence about Billy’s mental state at the time of the offenses and applied that evidence to criminal responsibility, while distinguishing the unsupported first count from the remaining counts. It did not erase the charged acts, nor did it settle every question about diagnosis, treatment, or future placement. The stipulated trial produced a clear legal conclusion about responsibility, followed by continued proceedings over care and confinement.