Not guilty by reason of insanity

Not guilty by reason of insanity was the decisive legal outcome in William Stanley Milligan’s case, converting a disputed psychiatric account into a formal judgment about criminal responsibility. The verdict did not rest simply on the existence of a diagnosis: the court accepted medical evidence that, when the charged acts occurred, Milligan’s illness impaired both his ability to distinguish right from wrong and his ability to refrain from acting. The book presents the ruling as the first of its kind in U.S. history for major crimes, bringing an extraordinary and harrowing case of multiple personality to public attention.

Charges and Identification

Late in 1977, Milligan awoke in jail after his arrest in connection with the kidnapping and rape of three women. The charges placed the question of responsibility before the court, while the women’s accounts and identification remained part of the case’s evidentiary setting. During an identification procedure, Donna recognized a photograph of a young man and expressed certainty that he was the person involved. The eventual insanity verdict did not erase the existence of the accusations or the evidence presented about them; it determined how the court understood Milligan’s mental state in relation to the alleged offenses.

The proceedings also preserved a distinction between separate counts. Judge Jay C. Flowers dismissed the first rape count, citing the absence of corroborating evidence and of a similar method of operation. The ruling on that count was not the same as the insanity determination: it addressed the evidentiary basis for prosecution, whereas the later finding addressed Milligan’s responsibility for the remaining charged conduct.

Competency Before Trial

Before the responsibility question was resolved, Milligan’s lawyers raised a different legal issue: whether he could assist in his own defense. Gary Schweickart and Judy Stevenson continued visiting him in prison despite receiving a letter firing them. The Public Defender’s Office funded a psychological evaluation, and Dr. Willis C. Driscoll administered tests on January 8 and 13, 1978.

On January 19, Schweickart and Stevenson presented Driscoll’s report to Judge Flowers as evidence that Milligan could not assist with his defense. The judge said he would direct the forensic psychiatry unit at Southwest Community Mental Health Center to examine him. The lawyers were concerned because they regarded the center as generally aligned with the prosecution. This competency dispute concerned Milligan’s capacity to participate in proceedings at that time; it was distinct from the later question of whether he was criminally responsible when the offenses occurred.

The Insanity Determination

At the point of judgment, the medical evidence was stipulated. Judge Flowers stated that the doctors agreed Milligan had been mentally ill at the time of the charged acts and that, by reason of that illness, he could neither distinguish right from wrong nor refrain from the acts. The court therefore accepted the insanity defense. Its conclusion was a legal determination about responsibility at the relevant time, not merely a clinical label or a finding that the allegations had not been made.

The diagnosis itself had not been beyond dispute. In later testimony, Frederick Milkie said he rejected multiple personality because he had not observed its symptoms and did not accept the definition given in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. His position underscores that psychiatric interpretation was contested even as the court relied on stipulated medical evidence for its ruling. The verdict thus emerged from a case in which diagnosis, observed behavior, and legal standards did not automatically coincide.

Significance and Limits

The decision made Milligan the first person in U.S. history to be found not guilty of major crimes by reason of insanity because he possessed multiple personalities. It also brought the diagnosis into public view and made the case a landmark in the legal treatment of multiple personality. The ruling’s importance lies in the court’s application of the insanity standard to evidence about Milligan’s mental condition at the time of the offenses, rather than in a general exemption for people with a psychiatric diagnosis.

The book’s account keeps several questions distinct: the women’s identifications and allegations, the dismissed count, Milligan’s earlier ability to assist counsel, the disputed diagnosis, and the court’s finding about his responsibility when the acts occurred. The verdict resolved the legal question before the court on the basis of the stipulated medical evidence; it did not make those different kinds of evidence interchangeable.