subject supposed to believe

The subject supposed to believe is a fictive figure onto whom a critic displaces belief. In a discussion of claims that phallic symbolism can be found everywhere, Slavoj Žižek argues that the supposedly naive orthodox believer is not an actual person identified by the example, but a figure invented by the critic. The expression names that displaced position: the critic’s belief is attributed to an imagined other.

Meaning and Formulation

The example concerns familiar interpretive claims that a forceful forward movement or a tall building must carry phallic meaning. The note questions the critic’s apparent distance from such readings. A critic may attribute belief in phallic symbols to a mythical orthodox Freudian; alternatively, the critic may endorse the phallic interpretation only in order to criticize or overcome it. The rhetorical stance changes, but in either case the belief is assigned to an other.

How Belief Is Displaced

The subject supposed to believe is therefore not simply someone who openly professes a doctrine. It is the imagined bearer of a belief that the critic cannot, or does not, acknowledge as their own. The critic projects—or, more precisely, transposes—the belief onto this fictive figure, making the other appear to be the one who takes phallic symbolism literally. The expression identifies a structure of attribution rather than an actual person or a documented school of thought.

Scope and Significance

The note’s point is not that every critic consciously holds the interpretation they attribute to an imagined orthodox Freudian. Rather, it draws attention to how belief can be maintained at a distance: the critic can treat the belief as belonging to someone else, even while repeating or relying on the interpretation. By exposing the supposed believer as a fiction produced by the critic, the expression turns the accusation of naive belief back toward the act of attribution itself.