Darius III
The PrinceDarius III appears in the discussion of Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia as the sovereign whose defeat made the permanence of that conquest possible. He is not developed through speeches, private motives, or a personal narrative arc; instead, his historical function is analytical. The character serves as the decisive test case for the principle that the difficulty of acquiring a state and the difficulty of holding it depend on the state's internal organization as much as on the conqueror's merit.
Identity and Political Setting
Darius III ruled a kingdom described as resembling the centralized government of the Turk. In that form of monarchy, authority was concentrated in a sole Prince, while other officials served by his favor as ministers and governors rather than as independent lords. The people therefore recognized one principal sovereign, and subordinate figures possessed no separate hereditary claim on popular loyalty comparable to that of the barons surrounding the King of France.
This structure distinguished Darius III's kingdom from a realm divided among ancient nobles. In a baronial system, a discontented lord could invite a foreign invader, open the way into the country, and later lead a new rebellion. In Darius III's kingdom, by contrast, the ruler's servants lacked both the independent authority and the popular attachment needed to turn defeat into a wider political collapse. The system was therefore resistant to invasion from within even though, once decisively conquered, it offered fewer surviving centers of resistance.
Defeat by Alexander the Great
Alexander the Great conquered Asia in only a few years and died before he had fully entered into possession of the territory. The apparent expectation would be that so vast a newly acquired realm, deprived of its conqueror, would immediately revolt. The example of Darius III explains why that did not happen. Alexander first had to defeat Darius III utterly and strip him of his dominions; after that defeat, Darius III died, and the causes of resistance associated with the former sovereign were removed.
The conquest thus depended on a complete military victory rather than on the defection of a native nobility. An invader attacking such a kingdom could not expect local barons to provide an easy entrance or to carry the population with them. The people were treated as politically united around the central ruler, while the officials around him were too dependent and too weakly rooted to become effective partners in an invasion. Alexander's success therefore rested on his own strength and on the destruction of the existing sovereign power, not on a coalition formed inside the kingdom.
Rule, Succession, and the Security of the Conquest
Darius III's death had consequences beyond the end of his personal rule. Because the kingdom had no network of hereditary lords with independent states and subjects, the removal of the ruler's family left no comparable native authority capable of organizing a general restoration. Before victory, the invader had little to hope for from those around Darius III; after victory, there was likewise little to fear from them. The same political arrangement that made the kingdom difficult to penetrate made it comparatively easy to retain once its armies and dynasty had been overcome.
The text nevertheless limits this conclusion. Alexander's successors were able to keep their hold on the conquered kingdom without facing disorders arising from the population or from surviving regional princes. Their difficulties came instead from their own ambition and mutual jealousies. Had they remained united, they could have enjoyed the territory undisturbed. The lasting vulnerability of the conquest thus shifted from Darius III's former subjects to the rivalries among the successors who inherited Alexander's empire.
Comparative and Narrative Significance
Darius III's case is set against the contrasting example of France, whose ancient nobles possessed personal authority, inherited rank, and the affection of their own subjects. A kingdom of that kind could be entered through the assistance of a baron but was difficult to hold afterward, because the same network of local powers could generate repeated movements against the conqueror. The contrast also explains why the Roman conquest of provinces containing many small princedoms produced repeated risings until the memory of their former rulers had been worn away by long Roman authority.
The comparison makes Darius III less a fully dramatized protagonist than an emblem of centralized sovereignty. Alexander the Great's relatively secure hold over Asia is attributed not simply to superior ability, while the difficulties faced by Pyrrhus and other conquerors are not treated as proof of lesser merit. The decisive variable is the political character of the conquered state. Darius III therefore represents the vanishing point of a centralized order: once its single sovereign and military power were destroyed, the kingdom lacked the independent aristocratic structures that could convert memory, privilege, and local allegiance into sustained rebellion.