Ku zhe shi zhi, shi zhe xu zhi

The expression “When you are weak, pretend to be strong; when you are strong, pretend to be weak” states a principle of tactical deception: appearances can be manipulated to make an opponent choose the wrong action. In the novel, it is more than an abstract maxim. False preparations, concealed troops, staged retreat, and misleading signs repeatedly shape the course of battle, while the saying’s most explicit use becomes an ironic instance of a commander’s confidence turning against him.

Meaning and Dramatic Use

The maxim describes a contest over interpretation as much as a contest of force. A commander seeks to make an enemy mistake apparent weakness for strength, or apparent strength for weakness, so that the enemy commits to an unfavorable course. Its force in the narrative comes from the gap between what a battlefield seems to show and what is actually being planned: walls, troop placements, fires, and even retreat can become signals designed to mislead.

The episodes do not present deception as a guaranteed formula. Its success depends on reading circumstances correctly and anticipating how the opponent will interpret them. A feint may expose an enemy’s assumptions, but the same confidence in one’s own interpretation can itself become a weakness.

Feints, Positions, and Supply

At Nanyang, Jia Xu reads Cao Cao’s preparations against Zhang Xiu’s city as a deliberate misdirection. Cao Cao appears to be gathering materials on the northwest side, while Jia Xu suspects that he has identified the weaker southeastern wall and is concealing his real intention. He advises Zhang Xiu to answer deception with deception: hide elite troops near the southeast wall, and put ordinary people in armor on the northwest wall to create a show of strength. The plan turns the enemy’s apparent knowledge of the defenses into a possible trap, though this passage presents Jia Xu’s assessment and proposed response rather than their final outcome.

The principle also meets the practical limits of war. At Guandu, Cao Cao’s army numbers only about a tenth of Yuan Shao’s, while its supplies are limited and cannot sustain a prolonged campaign. Xun You urges an immediate attack, arguing that Cao Cao’s veterans can fight at a numerical disadvantage; Cao Cao advances rather than waiting for the supply problem to become decisive. The episode emphasizes that strategic advantage depends not only on appearances or numbers, but also on timing and provisions.

At Bowang, Kong Ming’s orders arrange several coordinated deceptions. Guan Yu is to let the enemy pass before attacking the rear and supply train when he sees flames; Zhang Fei is to strike the stores at Bowang; other commanders prepare fires beside the ravine; and Zhao Zilong is to feign retreat after meeting Cao Cao’s troops. The plan makes the enemy’s forward advance part of the intended trap. Guan Yu and Zhang Fei doubt Kong Ming’s judgment, particularly because he will not be near the fighting, while Xuande rebukes them and follows the orders. The evidence records the arrangements and the brothers’ skepticism, not the result of the battle.

In the arrow episode, Kong Ming uses the weather and Cao Cao’s expectations to turn defense into a source of supplies. A dense fog hides boats carrying straw-covered barriers. When Cao Cao hears the noise and believes an attack may be underway, he orders archers and crossbowmen to fire into the fog. The arrows strike the straw, and the boats return with their loads covered in ammunition. Here the apparent threat draws a response that serves the adversary’s purpose: the misreading is produced not by a false army but by sound, obscured vision, and the defender’s decision to fire.

Huarong: The Maxim Reversed

The expression is spoken most directly during Cao Cao’s retreat after the fighting at Red Cliffs. Faced with a choice between the longer main road and the shorter, more difficult road toward Huarong, Cao Cao hears that smoke is rising along the Huarong route while the main road appears clear. He interprets the smoke as a feint planted by Kong Ming to drive his army onto an ambush on the main road. Citing the maxim and the teaching of The Art of War, Cao Cao chooses the route that looks dangerous, reasoning that the danger is therefore staged.

His reasoning fails. The apparently threatening route is the one he takes, and his exhausted men encounter a narrow, muddy path where the horses become stuck. Cao Cao orders his soldiers to cover the mud with branches and undergrowth so the army can continue. The scene makes the expression’s central risk plain: recognizing that appearances can deceive does not ensure that the interpretation is right. Cao Cao’s confidence that he has seen through Kong Ming’s plan leads him into difficulty rather than out of it.

A Principle Without a Guaranteed Victory

Across these episodes, deception takes distinct forms: Jia Xu proposes disguising a city’s defenses; Kong Ming assigns concealed positions and a feigned retreat at Bowang; and the arrow stratagem turns fog and noise into a false impression of attack. The Huarong episode reverses the pattern by making Cao Cao’s own strategic suspicion the means by which he misreads the situation. Together, these uses give the maxim a dramatic edge: military judgment depends on interpreting signs, but no commander is immune to mistaking a convincing explanation for the truth.