Prohibition on Checquy Members Killing One Another

The Prohibition on Checquy Members Killing One Another is a longstanding rule against one member killing another, founded not only on the illegality of murder but on the danger of removing part of the British Isles’ defense. Its force is set against a history of rare but consequential breaches: four illegal killings of Court members by other Court members, with the perpetrators usually punished and one remaining undiscovered until after her death.

Purpose and Scope

The rule applies to members of the Checquy killing one another. Its institutional rationale goes beyond the ordinary criminal prohibition: each member is part of the organization’s defense, so murder also diminishes the protection available to the British Isles. The rule is presented as a vital boundary within a secretive, centuries-old organization whose Court members wield considerable authority and whose personnel may be trained and equipped for violence.

The account distinguishes illegal internal killings from deaths caused by outside organizations, deaths in the field, and legal executions. Those categories matter: the prohibition does not mean the Checquy has no history of violence or execution, but marks murder by one member against another as an exceptional internal breach. The account notes that a major slaughter in 1788 was later declared legal, setting it apart from the four notorious illegal killings.

Recorded Breaches

The four cases span several centuries and involve different ranks and methods. In 1678, Lord Charles Huxley was killed on the orders of his wife, Lady Adelia Huxley. The following year, Lady Adelia was killed by Bishop Roger Torville, her husband’s lover. These linked cases show how private relationships could become entangled with violence at the highest levels of the organization.

In 1845, Rook Angelina Corfax was killed at the command of her counterpart, Rook Cassandra Bartlett. Bartlett concealed her role successfully during her lifetime; her journals revealed it only after her death. In 1951, Rook Juniper Constable killed Bishop Donald Montgomery. Together, the cases make clear that the prohibition reaches across ranks and does not prevent Court members from becoming perpetrators or victims.

Enforcement and Limits

In all but the Corfax case, the killers were swiftly located and tried, then executed after trials that were notably less swift. The exception exposes a limit to the Checquy’s ability to enforce its own rule: Bartlett evaded detection, and the truth emerged only through her journals after she had died. The account emphasizes how unusual that evasion was, given the organization’s tracking capabilities.

The rarity of these murders is itself significant. The Checquy’s age, secrecy, internal bureaucracy, members’ training and supernatural abilities, and the Court’s broad authority might suggest frequent internal violence; the recorded history instead identifies only four illegal Court-member killings by fellow members. The rule is therefore described not as an assurance that violence cannot occur, but as a boundary whose breach is both exceptional and dangerous.

Significance in the Plot

The prohibition shapes Myfanwy’s assessment of the threat against her. She reasons that someone attempting to have her killed, or succeeding in destroying her memory, is placing themselves in grave danger by violating a rule that is almost never broken. Yet she does not take the history of enforcement as a guarantee of safety: she doubts that a full-time bodyguard would help and fears that explaining the request would draw attention to her.

Her concern connects the rule’s institutional purpose to the wider danger of internal betrayal. If a Court member turns against another, the problem is not only a personal attack but evidence that the organization’s protective core may be compromised. The prohibition thus expresses the Checquy’s dependence on its own members: their survival sustains the country’s defense, while their violence against one another threatens it from within.