From Appearance to Being
Being and NothingnessThis thread follows the opening argument from the rejection of hidden essences to the claim that appearing depends on a transphenomenal ground.
increasing
Bearing strength in each event
decreasing
The Series of Appearances

The Series of Appearances
Starting Point
The inquiry begins by treating an existent as the series of appearances through which it manifests itself. No hidden interior is needed to explain its force or identity.
Consequence
This move makes appearance fully positive, but leaves open what makes an appearance more than a private impression.
The Infinite Object

The Infinite Object
A New Difficulty
An object is wholly present in each profile and also exceeds every profile. Its series of possible appearances cannot be completed or given all at once.
Stakes
The finite appearance now points beyond itself. The opening argument has replaced the old hidden essence with a problem about transcendence and infinity.
Being of Appearing

Being of Appearing
The Question
The account distinguishes the phenomenon of being, which can appear to inquiry, from the being of the phenomenon, which makes appearance possible.
Stakes
The object does not reveal its being as one more quality. Knowledge alone therefore cannot account for the being on which revelation depends.
The Cogito's Limit

The Cogito's Limit
Consciousness and Object
Consciousness is revealed as non-substantial and pre-reflectively aware of itself while directed toward an object. This avoids reducing it to an inner thing.
Unresolved Relation
Yet consciousness cannot create the object's independent being. Idealism and realism both fail to explain the connection between the two regions.
The In-Itself

The In-Itself
Provisional Account
Being-in-itself is uncreated, self-identical, opaque, and contingent. It does not act, become, or depend on a possible explanation.
Handoff
The introduction leaves consciousness and the phenomenon radically distinct. The rest of the book must explain how their relation can nevertheless be real.
Introduction, Section I
Introduction, Section I, after the account of the phenomenon
Introduction, Section II
Introduction, Sections III–IV
Introduction, Sections V–VI