Norman Conquest of England

The Norman Conquest of England serves in Common Sense as both an indictment of hereditary monarchy and a warning about the consequences of leaving political authority unsettled. Paine presents William the Conqueror’s seizure of the English throne as a conquest by force, not a legitimate foundation for hereditary right; he then makes that history a cautionary parallel for the American colonies, which, he argues, must form a government of their own before a new ruler can occupy the vacant seat of power.

The conquest as an origin of monarchy

Paine rejects the notion that English monarchy has a dignified or providential beginning. He describes William as a Frenchman who landed with an armed force and established himself king against the consent of England’s inhabitants. In Paine’s account, the conquest offers no divine sanction: its forceful origin is precisely what makes the claim of hereditary right untenable. He calls William a usurper and says the antiquity of English monarchy cannot withstand scrutiny.

That argument belongs to a wider challenge to hereditary succession. Paine asks how the first king could have acquired power—by lot, election, or usurpation—and argues that none of these possibilities gives the first ruler authority to bind all later generations to his family. The English conquest makes the usurpation case concrete: the claim to rule descends from a seizure of power, not from a right that the conquered population freely granted. For Paine, an institution’s age cannot make its origins honorable.

A precedent of rule imposed by force

The conquest also figures as an example of what happens when a people does not first secure a lawful political settlement. Paine says William imposed law on England at the point of the sword. The image is not simply an indictment of the conqueror; it supports a practical warning to the colonies. Until government in America is legally and authoritatively occupied, Paine argues, the colonists remain exposed to the possibility that a forceful adventurer will seize the opening and treat them as William treated England.

This possibility gives urgency to Paine’s proposal that the colonies form their own government deliberately. He warns that delay could allow a future claimant to exploit political instability and impose authority before the people can establish their own laws. England’s conquest thus becomes a historical precedent for a projected American danger: leaving government unconstituted may invite conquest, and conquest may replace self-government with laws imposed by force.

From imperial dependence to independence

Paine places the English precedent within his broader argument against continued dependence on Great Britain. The colonies, he says, cannot expect fair and effective government from a power thousands of miles away, unfamiliar with local conditions, and slow to answer petitions. In his view, the problem is not merely administrative inconvenience. So long as the colonies remain British subjects while resisting British rule, foreign governments will regard them as rebels, and other powers will have little reason to offer mediation or assistance.

A declaration of independence would change that political position. Paine argues that America could then address foreign courts as a separate nation, explain its unsuccessful attempts at peaceful redress, and offer trade on peaceful terms. This move from dependent subjects to an independent political community is the opposite of the relation he attributes to the conquest: instead of having law imposed by a distant power, the colonists should establish the authority under which they will live.

Historical warning and political design

Paine’s use of the conquest is part of a larger historical case against monarchy. He contrasts the relative peace he associates with early societies without kings with the wars and rebellions that, he argues, have marked English royal history. He cites England’s repeated civil conflicts, including the long contest between the houses of York and Lancaster, to challenge the claim that hereditary succession reliably prevents political disorder. The conquest supplies the starkest origin story in that case: monarchy begins not in consent, but in the successful use of force.

Against that history, Paine sketches a government founded through deliberation rather than inherited authority. He proposes annual assemblies, a president chosen through a rotating process among the colonies, and a Continental Congress to which the assemblies would be accountable. These are offered as suggestions rather than a finished plan, but their governing principle is clear: political authority should be formed before officials are chosen to exercise it. In Paine’s argument, the conquest of England is not an event to admire or repeat; it is the cautionary example that makes timely, collective self-government urgent.