Bill of Rights 1689

The Bill of Rights 1689 serves as a historical example in the Federalist argument about whether a constitution founded on popular authority needs a separate bill of rights. Its significance lies in the contrast drawn between rights wrested from a monarch and rights grounded in the people’s continuing sovereignty: the essays argue that constitutional limits remain essential, but that their force depends on the structure and enforcement of government, not merely on a catalogue of declarations.

Historical Origin and Political Meaning

The essay traces bills of rights to agreements between kings and subjects: restrictions on royal prerogative made in favor of privileges claimed by the governed. It places Magna Carta, secured from King John by barons bearing arms, in this tradition, along with later confirmations by succeeding princes and the Petition of Right assented to by Charles I. The Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, later given statutory form as the Bill of Rights, is the next example in that sequence.

In this account, the Bill of Rights belongs to a political world in which subjects must reserve protections against a ruler who otherwise possesses prerogative. The essay therefore questions whether that model transfers directly to constitutions established in the name of the people and administered through their representatives. The distinction is not that rights lack importance, but that their stated source and constitutional function differ.

Popular Sovereignty and the Case Against Separate Reservations

The argument contrasts the inherited charter tradition with a government expressly founded on popular authority. Where the people establish the constitution through their representatives and retain the powers they have not surrendered, the essay maintains, they do not stand in the same relation to government as subjects negotiating privileges with a prince. It invokes the Constitution’s opening declaration, “WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States,” as a recognition of popular rights more fundamental, in its view, than a collection of political maxims.

That claim is qualified rather than absolute. The essay does not say that constitutional protections are unnecessary. It argues that an enumeration of particular rights is less suited to a constitution regulating the nation’s general political interests than to a state constitution that governs a broad range of personal and private affairs. It also contends that the proposed Constitution and the Constitution of New York each contain what is reasonably appropriate to their respective purposes.

Constitutional Limits and Judicial Enforcement

The surrounding discussion explains why the argument for popular foundations does not make written restraints dispensable. A limited constitution, as the essay defines it, specifies exceptions to legislative authority, including prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Such restrictions can be preserved in practice only if courts may declare void legislative acts contrary to the Constitution’s manifest terms. Without that means of enforcement, reservations of rights would amount to nothing.

The essay rejects the claim that judicial review makes the judiciary superior to the legislature. A legislature exercises delegated authority; an act that exceeds the terms of that delegation is void, just as representatives cannot possess greater authority than the people who empowered them. The Bill of Rights thus supplies a point of comparison in a larger constitutional debate: historical restraints on rulers are set against a system that locates authority in the people and relies on constitutional limits, judicial interpretation, and institutional design to keep public power within its bounds.