Standing army

Standing armies are central to the argument that political disunion could endanger liberty more profoundly than the proposed Constitution. The danger, in this account, is not confined to whether a constitution expressly permits a permanent military establishment: it lies in the chain of insecurity, rivalry, and recurring war that would make such forces seem necessary, elevate the executive, and leave citizens less able to resist military power. Preserving the Union is therefore presented as a way to avoid the conditions that could make standing armies instruments of domestic subordination.

Standing Armies as a Consequence of Insecurity

The argument begins with a distinction between a constitutional possibility and a political necessity. Critics say that the new Constitution does not prevent standing armies and may therefore allow them. The response does not claim that the possibility is settled; their existence under the Constitution is described as uncertain. Instead, it shifts attention to the alternative: standing armies would, the argument predicts, follow inevitably from dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent wars and constant apprehension would require constant preparation, making permanent military forces a consequence of insecurity rather than a uniquely constitutional innovation.

In a divided country, weaker states or confederacies would be the first to build up forces. Lacking the population and resources of more powerful neighbors, they would seek equality through more organized defense: disciplined troops and fortifications. These measures could give smaller or naturally weaker polities a military advantage over larger rivals that lacked vigorous government and comparable forces. The advantage would not remain uncontested. States with greater power would not accept a loss of standing or security for long, and would adopt similar methods to recover their former position. Military preparation would thus become self-reinforcing: each polity’s attempt to protect itself would give its neighbors reason to arm in turn.

The predicted result is not a single emergency force that disappears when a danger passes, but the spread of the same instruments of despotism across the country. The argument connects repeated insecurity to recurring preparation and recurring preparation to military establishments on a scale that could reshape civil government. Its warning turns on this progression: a decision made in the name of safety can generate the very domestic danger against which citizens later find themselves poorly equipped to act.

War, Executive Growth, and Civil Liberty

The growth of military establishments is linked directly to a shift in political power. States that resort to disciplined armies would also be compelled to strengthen their executive authority. War, the essay argues, tends to increase the executive at the expense of the legislature. Military preparation therefore threatens liberty through more than the presence of troops: it changes the balance among governing institutions, strengthening the part of government most closely associated with command and immediate action.

The argument then traces how sustained military danger alters the standing of citizens. Where threats are perpetual, the government must remain prepared to repel them, and its armies must be large enough for immediate defense. The constant demand for soldiers raises their importance while lowering the citizen’s relative condition. In territories repeatedly exposed to war, frequent infringements of rights can gradually weaken the people’s sense of those rights. The soldiery may first be regarded as protectors, then as superiors; from that shift, the passage to regarding them as masters is described as neither distant nor difficult. A population accustomed to military protection and diminished in its confidence in civil rights may find it difficult to resist usurpations backed by force.

The contrast clarifies why the danger is political and civic, not merely military. A numerous army is presented as dangerous in a society where its importance is continually affirmed by external threats and the population is habituated to its authority. The essay’s recurring concern is that protection can alter the relationship between protector and protected: as reliance on military power grows, the citizen’s independent standing may contract. That erosion helps explain why the argument treats standing armies as a consequence of insecurity and as a possible source of diminished political freedom.

The Continental and Insular Comparison

The essay distinguishes a country frequently exposed to invasion from one whose situation makes a large domestic army less necessary. Great Britain is placed in the latter category. Its insular position and powerful navy are described as safeguards against foreign invasion, reducing the need for a numerous army within the kingdom. The force considered sufficient was one capable of opposing a sudden landing until the militia could assemble. In the argument’s account, public opinion would not have tolerated a larger domestic establishment, and this geographic advantage helped preserve liberty despite other political failings.

The counterfactual makes the comparison serve as a warning about geography and institutions together. If Britain had been situated on the continent, it would, the essay supposes, have had to maintain domestic forces comparable to those of Europe’s great powers; under those conditions, it might have become subject to the absolute power of a single ruler. The point is not that an army of any size necessarily destroys liberty, but that recurrent exposure to danger creates political pressure for large forces and makes their influence harder to resist.

A separate comparison concerns countries seldom threatened by internal invasion. Their rulers can maintain comparatively small armies, which are rarely needed for domestic defense. The civil order in such a setting is less likely to be bent around military demands: laws need not be relaxed for continual military emergencies, and citizens do not become accustomed to looking to soldiers for protection. An army under these circumstances may assist civil magistrates against a small faction, mob, or insurrection, yet remain unable to impose encroachments against the united body of the people. The contrast identifies the conditions that limit military power: a small force, a vigorous civil order, and citizens who remain alert to the danger that power may prejudice their rights.

The Union as a Security Against Militarization

The Union is presented as a means of preserving for the United States an advantage resembling Britain’s relative insulation. Europe is distant, and European colonies nearby are expected to remain too weak to pose a dangerous threat. In that position, extensive military establishments should not be required for security. Political unity thus has a double significance: it is a structure of government and a protection against the external pressures that could make a large standing army appear indispensable.

Disunion would reverse those conditions. If the states remained separate, or more probably formed two or three confederacies, they would soon face the continental predicament described earlier. Each would have to guard against the ambition and jealousy of the others; the means chosen for defense would threaten the liberties they were intended to secure. The predicted military buildup follows from the same rivalrous logic as the competition among weaker and stronger states: preparation by one side provokes preparation by another, and the executive and military establishments gain importance at civil liberty’s expense.

This argument places the standing army within a broader account of constitutional choice. The question is not presented as a simple choice between a potentially dangerous national government and an uncomplicated freedom among separate states. Instead, the essay compares the possible consequences of the proposed Union with the likely pressures of disunion. It urges readers to weigh the danger that military institutions could grow out of persistent interstate insecurity against the security afforded by a union in which extensive domestic forces would not be necessary. In that reasoning, preserving the Union is a preventive measure: it seeks to avert the conditions under which citizens might come to accept military power as the price of safety.