Zeeland is cited as an example of the cost of unanimity in a confederacy: in 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia, which recognized the independence of the United Netherlands, was concluded without Zeeland’s consent. The instance supports the book’s warning that when collective action is made dependent on every member’s agreement, constitutional rules may be bypassed under pressure, while a weak central government remains vulnerable to both paralysis and dangerous overreach.

Zeeland and the Westphalia Treaty

In its discussion of the United Netherlands, the book notes that the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by which the confederacy’s independence was finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zeeland. Zeeland’s absence from the agreement is not developed as a narrative of local politics; it functions as evidence about the workings of a confederated system. A consequential act affecting the whole union proceeded despite the lack of unanimity among its members.

The Example’s Constitutional Significance

The treaty is grouped with other cases in which the States-General exceeded or departed from constitutional limits: in 1688 they concluded a treaty on their own authority, and a later peace treaty with Great Britain also departed from the principle of unanimity. Together, these instances show the tension between formal rules requiring collective consent and the practical pressure to secure public ends. Zeeland’s non-consent makes that tension visible in a specific case: the confederacy’s independence was recognized through an agreement that did not satisfy the unanimity principle.

Weak Government, Emergency, and Overreach

The book draws a wider institutional lesson from such departures. A weak constitution, it argues, may end in dissolution for lack of adequate powers, or in the usurpation of powers deemed necessary for public safety. Once exceptional authority has been assumed, whether it stops at a useful limit or advances toward a dangerous extreme depends on circumstances. The Zeeland example therefore belongs to an argument about structural weakness rather than a judgment on the province itself: when a confederacy cannot reliably reconcile member consent with common action, the rules may be set aside, and the resulting exercise of power carries risks of its own.