The Allies hand Spain the list of 104 in October 1947, when the Allied Control Council in Spain formally submitted a blacklist to the government in Madrid. The eleven-page document gave concrete form to years of largely fruitless demands for the location and surrender of people connected to Nazi activity and collaborationist regimes. Its delivery became a test of whether the Franco government would cooperate with postwar justice; the answer, shaped by Cold War politics, was effectively no.

Background and purpose

For more than two years, the Allies had repeatedly asked Spain to help find and hand over hundreds of people associated with Nazi activities in Spain. They also sought prominent collaborators from occupied countries, many accused of crimes against humanity and believed, or known, to be living comfortably in Spain. The requests produced little result. By October 1947, the list represented the most developed form of those demands, but the passage of time had not made the Franco government more willing to comply.

The document arrived in a rapidly changing international climate. In the span of two years after Hitler’s defeat, Cold War antagonism had altered the position of the Franco regime to its advantage. The novel presents anti-Soviet fervor and fear of another war with Stalin as the forces behind Spain’s diplomatic maneuvering before the victorious Allied powers. The handover therefore took place in a setting where demands for accountability had to compete with the strategic realignment of the postwar order.

The list and the people it named

The List of 104, also known as the Black List, identified people the Allies described as “hateful Germans”: individuals who had actively furthered Hitler’s cause and could not hide their responsibility behind claims of discipline or obedience to superiors. They were citizens of the Third Reich and had outstanding cases before German courts. Yet the Spanish regime considered these same individuals important to preserving good relations with the victors, a contradiction that shaped its response to the list.

One hundred and three entries were men; the sole woman was Clarita Stauffer. The list gave her correct address, 14 Calle Galileo in Madrid, and described her as one of the principal organizers of a secret relief association. It accused her of involvement in supplying false documents and finding employment for Germans, among other activities, and said that she had received a special German Embassy permit at the end of the war to obtain Spanish nationality for the express purpose of continuing those activities after defeat. Her inclusion linked the diplomatic document to the clandestine assistance network operating from her Madrid home.

Other named figures included Johannes Bernhardt, described as an SS general and president of SOFINDUS, a German state institution, and accused of responsibility for clandestine supplies to German troops trapped on France’s western coast during and after liberation. Horst Alberto Carlos Fuldner, whose name was incorrectly transcribed in the list, was identified as a member of the Sicherheitsdienst sent from Germany to organize underground activities after the defeat; he was listed at a Madrid address but was in Tarrasa near Barcelona when the document was submitted. Eberhard Messerschmidt, a former assistant to the German Embassy’s naval attaché who had worked for German naval intelligence, was listed as residing in Cercedilla. The list thus combined claims about wartime roles with addresses and information about the men’s postwar whereabouts.

Spain’s response

Foreign Minister Alberto Martín-Artajo received the eleven-page document in English. The novel makes clear that the names could not have surprised him: he knew both of the Allies’ earlier demands and how slowly his predecessor had acted, even under more difficult circumstances. Rather than promptly address the claims, Martín-Artajo let time pass until the Allied Council’s patience was exhausted. When he finally met its representatives, he brought out documents, letters, and certificates they had not previously seen.

The explanations varied from person to person. Some could not be surrendered because, officials claimed, they had already been Spanish citizens for years; others had received nationality from the Generalissimo for their assistance to the National Army when the Condor Legion came to Spain’s aid. The government said that some could not be found, that one held Spanish nationality because he directed a strategically important company, and that an Austrian was protected by the Cardinal of Toledo and Spain’s primate because of his Catholic faith and the risk of trouble with the Vatican. For others, officials professed not to know them. In Stauffer’s case, they asserted that she had been born in Madrid and was therefore Spanish, a patriot, Pilar Primo de Rivera’s right hand, and a tireless worker famed for charitable works. The repeated claims converted nationality, religious influence, administrative ignorance, and patriotic standing into barriers against surrender.

Outcome and significance

The outcome is stated without ambiguity: none of the people named felt the slightest anxiety at this latest and final demand. The list did not produce their surrender or even immediate unease. Instead, the government’s procedural delays and retrospective or protective claims of Spanish nationality turned a demand for legal accountability into a display of the regime’s ability to shield those it considered useful or politically protected.

The event’s significance lies in the gap between the precision of the list and the evasiveness of the response. It supplied names, alleged roles, and addresses, including Stauffer’s exact Madrid residence, yet information alone could not compel cooperation from a government that chose to protect or disavow the people sought. The Cold War shift helps explain why the Allied demand failed, while the officials’ varied excuses show how protection could be administered through paperwork and diplomatic calculation. The list marked the culmination of Allied claims, but not their fulfillment.