The Machinery of Blowback

Traces how covert support, rejected cooperation, and later security failures form a chain connecting earlier policy to new danger.

increasingBearing stren­gth in each eventdecreasing

The Afghan Recruitment

The Afghan Recruitment American and allied intelligence services help recruit, train, and arm militant Islamists for the war against the Soviet Union. A Proxy Force The recruits include many non-Afghans and become part of a broader network. Long-Term Risk The effort creates capabilities and relationships that remain after the strategic alliance ends.

The Sadat Assassination

The Sadat Assassination Militants associated with the wider Islamist movement assassinate Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. A Former Organizer Sadat had supported the creation of forces used in the anti-Soviet campaign. Early Blowback The attack illustrates how groups assembled for one purpose can become threats to former partners.

The 1993 Plot

The 1993 Plot A bombing at the World Trade Center connects American territory to the activities of militants shaped by the Afghan war. Network Continuity Chomsky recounts claims that techniques taught during the earlier conflict informed the operation. An Unheeded Warning The earlier attack makes later claims of complete surprise harder to accept.

Sudan’s Rejected Offer

Sudan’s Rejected Offer Sudan offers information and cooperation concerning bin Laden and suspected militants, but Washington rejects the offers. A Missed Opportunity Chomsky cites reporting that Sudan held suspects and offered detailed intelligence before the United States struck Al-Shifa. Relations Sour The attack and rejection of cooperation help explain why Sudan later releases suspects in anger.

An Intelligence Failure

An Intelligence Failure Reporting cited by Chomsky suggests Sudan possessed information that might have helped track Al-Qaida before the attacks. Political Obstacles The refusal to work with Sudan is attributed to hostility between governments, not simply a lack of available information. A Costly Aftermath The episode complicates claims that surveillance alone can prevent attacks while political choices obstruct cooperation.

From 1979 through the 1980s

1981

1993

Before and after the American missile attack in August 1998

After September 11, 2001