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Algeria

September 11

Algeria is presented as a revealing case in Noam Chomsky’s argument that counterterrorism can serve both as a response to real attacks and as cover for state violence. The country’s government is described as willing to cooperate against radical Islamist networks, but also as a regime that could welcome international support for extending its own repression. That tension makes Algeria an example of the book’s insistence that the same standards must apply to powerful states, their allies, and their opponents.

A prospective counterterrorism partner

In discussing a lawful response to terrorism, Chomsky says that governments in the Middle East and North Africa—including Algeria’s government, which he characterizes as exceptionally brutal—were eager to join the United States against the networks attacking them. These governments were on the front line, he argues, and sought cooperation against real threats. But their support came with a demand: evidence identifying those responsible and action within at least a minimally respectful framework of international law.

That qualification distinguishes cooperation from an open-ended authorization to use force. The proposed alternative to retaliation was to establish responsibility through evidence and pursue action under the United Nations Charter, with the Security Council’s oversight. In Chomsky’s account, Algeria’s willingness to join a campaign did not remove the need for those constraints; rather, its own record made consistent limits especially important.

The danger of legitimizing state violence

Algeria also appears in Chomsky’s warning about the coalition the United States was trying to assemble. He argues that governments with records of state violence might welcome a U.S.-sponsored international system if it gave them permission to continue their own abuses. Algeria, he says, could be pleased to receive authorization to expand its state terrorism. The point is not that its participation against radical networks was unreal, but that the coalition’s political terms could make the distinction between counterterrorism and repression depend on who was acting.

This concern connects Algeria to Chomsky’s broader account of official definitions. He describes terrorism as coercive violence directed at civilians for political, religious, or ideological ends, and argues that comparable conduct is often classified differently when undertaken by a state or great power. Under that convention, the violence of powerful governments is called diplomacy, counterterrorism, or security policy, while similar acts by their enemies are named terrorism. Algeria’s potential gain from coalition membership is thus part of a wider critique: counterterrorism language can confer legitimacy on state action without resolving whether that action meets a consistent standard.

The coalition and its double standard

The rhetoric of an international community further sharpens the contradiction. Chomsky argues that Western governments and intellectuals often use the phrase to mean themselves, excluding those who oppose the actions of wealthy and powerful states. In that account, the label “terrorism” is likewise applied by convention to violence directed against the United States and its allies. Algeria’s possible place in the coalition shows how this framework could enlist governments with their own coercive practices while presenting the alliance as a unified response to terror.

Later, Chomsky says that governments rushed to join the U.S.-declared War on Terror partly to gain support for fighting terrorism within their own borders. He cites Russia and Turkey as clear examples and notes that Turkey had already received substantial U.S. assistance. Algeria belongs to the same regional and political discussion, but the evidence does not assign it those specific roles or outcomes. Its significance is instead expressed in the earlier warning: a coalition may become a source of permission for state repression if it demands no more than alignment with the leading power.

Significance in the argument

Algeria’s place in the discussion is therefore deliberately unsettled. It is described as facing attacks from radical Islamist networks and as prepared to act against them, while its government is also invoked as an example of a regime that might use international backing to extend state violence. Chomsky’s proposed test is procedural as well as definitional: establish responsibility with evidence, act within the United Nations framework, and resist changing the meaning of terrorism according to the identity of the perpetrator. Algeria makes the stakes of that test concrete without resolving the tension between confronting non-state violence and preventing counterterrorism from becoming a license for state abuse.