The campaign of Turkish repression against the Kurds in the 1990s is presented as both a severe episode of state violence and a revealing example of how the post-September 11 counterterrorism coalition reordered political roles. Chomsky argues that Turkey’s campaign depended significantly on American arms and support, yet Turkey was later welcomed as a contributor to the effort to protect Kabul from terrorism—a contrast that exposes the selective use of that label.

The Campaign and Its International Support

Chomsky describes Turkey’s campaign against its Kurdish population as terrible and exceptionally brutal. He places it among the worst atrocities of the 1990s and characterizes the state’s conduct during the campaign as a campaign of state terror. The account does not detail individual operations or provide casualty figures; its emphasis is on the campaign’s severity and its place in a broader pattern of state violence.

The United States, in Chomsky’s account, was not a distant observer. Turkey received very large quantities of American weapons, which he says contributed decisively to its ability to conduct the repression. American support therefore connects the campaign to a wider argument in the book: official definitions of terrorism, when applied consistently to coercion directed at civilian populations for political purposes, would also raise questions about state policy and the actions of powerful states.

Turkey’s Role After September 11

After the September 11 attacks, Turkey was the first country to offer troops for a new phase of the American-led war on terror. The Turkish prime minister, as Chomsky recounts it, explained the offer as recognition of American assistance during Turkey’s campaign against the Kurds. The sequence gives the military contribution a pointed context: the state whose repression had benefited from American arms now joined a coalition claiming to protect Kabul from terrorism.

Chomsky underscores this reversal by noting that Turkey had been warmly praised for its achievements during the campaign, despite the atrocities he associates with it. Its reputation as a partner against terrorism thus rested alongside its recent record of repression and its reliance on American military, diplomatic, and ideological assistance. The contrast is not incidental to his argument; it shows how states can be classified as authoritative allies in one political setting even when their own conduct resembles the coercive violence condemned in others.

Significance in the Book’s Argument

The campaign serves as a concrete example in Chomsky’s critique of the post-September 11 coalition and the language of counterterrorism. He argues that governments around the world used the attacks as an opportunity to intensify repressive policies. Turkey’s case makes that continuity visible: earlier state violence, materially supported by the United States, was followed by Turkey’s participation in the new campaign under the banner of fighting terrorism.

The episode also sharpens the book’s distinction between the official naming of violence and the standards used to judge it. Chomsky’s point is not that the account supplies a complete history of the Kurdish campaign, but that its treatment exposes a political inconsistency: repression condemned when attributed to an adversary can coexist with military support and alliance when carried out by a partner. Turkey’s transition from recipient of American support to contributor to the counterterrorism coalition encapsulates that argument.