Global War on Terror

The Global War on Terror is the name given to the post-September 11 campaign that the book treats as both a military undertaking and a widening political program. Its significance, in this account, lies in the gap between its public justification and its consequences: the campaign is linked to interrupted relief, expanded domestic repression, and the consolidation of U.S. military power, while also repeating features of earlier policies described as counterterrorism.

Naming the Campaign

The language used for force is itself part of the argument. The United States initially called its response a “crusade,” but quickly abandoned that term after being warned that it would alienate potential allies in the Islamic world. It then adopted the language of “war,” a label the book contrasts with the descriptions used for earlier uses of force: the 1991 Gulf War was openly called a war, while NATO’s bombing of Serbia was presented as “humanitarian intervention.” The author argues that such labels do political work, placing one action inside a familiar category and lending another a humanitarian appearance.

That contrast informs the book’s skepticism toward the campaign’s stated purposes. It does not treat a government’s declaration of humanitarian intent as sufficient evidence of humanitarian action; instead, it directs attention to the consequences of force and to the interests that may lie behind official explanations. In the discussion of Afghanistan, the author proposes that the bombings may have served a strategic purpose beyond their declared response to terrorism: demonstrating what the United States could do to countries that failed to observe the rules of its preferred international order.

Strategic Continuity and Military Reach

The campaign is portrayed as a new phase of a familiar policy, echoing the Reagan administration’s earlier “war on terrorism.” The book argues that the administration of George W. Bush used the crisis to reinforce an already overwhelming military advantage and advance global “dominance.” It links that aim to the establishment, for the first time, of major U.S. military bases in Central Asia after the war in Afghanistan.

Those bases matter in the author’s account not only as military installations but as part of a wider strategic geography. They could facilitate the presence of U.S.-dominated multinational corporations in a region rich in resources, support influence over those resources, and help encircle the energy reserves of the Persian Gulf. Before the war in Afghanistan, the author identifies Diego Garcia as the safest base in the U.S. network directed toward the Gulf; the new Central Asian position, he argues, made forceful intervention easier. These are presented as the author’s interpretation of strategic purpose, rather than as disclosed government planning documents.

The book also connects the campaign to the signaling of resolve. During a visit by Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, he urged the U.S. administration to take Arab responses to its support for Israeli repression seriously. The account reports that senior U.S. officials instead emphasized the scale of American power, describing the campaign in Afghanistan as evidence of capabilities far beyond those demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. The author sees this exchange as an instance of a broader message: strength was meant to command respect and discourage challenges to U.S. power.

Humanitarian Costs

The book measures the campaign against effects on civilians and aid systems, not only against its stated objectives. It describes a warning by NATO’s European leaders that a massive assault on Muslim populations would play into Osama bin Laden’s hands and draw the United States and its allies into a “diabolical trap.” The warning frames retaliation as a potential mechanism of escalation: a response intended to defeat terrorism could instead strengthen the conditions in which it operated.

In Afghanistan, the account follows the disruption of food relief after the air strikes began on October 7. The World Food Programme had sent hundreds of tonnes of food into the country in early October, but estimated that these supplies would meet no more than 15 percent of need. The September 11 attacks had already prompted the withdrawal of international teams and a three-week interruption in deliveries; after the bombing began, the Programme suspended its convoys and locally organized distributions. A United Nations refugee-agency spokesperson said that 7.5 million Afghans were short of food and near famine, while humanitarian officials warned that a mass flight of 1.5 million refugees was becoming more likely.

The account contrasts air-dropped rations with the overland aid that relief organizations considered more effective. Aid groups criticized the U.S. drops as propaganda rather than an adequate way to deliver urgently needed food, especially because the air strikes had interrupted the truck convoys capable of moving large quantities. World Food Programme officials called for drops to take place in daylight, with advance warning and volunteers on the ground to gather and distribute the food. The juxtaposition makes the central policy conflict concrete: a highly visible act of relief could not, in the author’s presentation, compensate for the interruption of the more substantial delivery system.

Political and Domestic Consequences

The campaign’s effects extend beyond Afghanistan in the book’s account. The author argues that governments around the world used the September 11 attacks to introduce or intensify severe and repressive policies. Russia joined the counterterrorism coalition in hopes of gaining permission to continue its actions in Chechnya, and the author says it was not disappointed; China likewise used the climate for its own purposes. Turkey offered troops for the new phase of the campaign, while its prime minister cited U.S. support for Turkey’s campaign of repression against its Kurdish population. Israel, the account says, anticipated that strengthened U.S. backing would enable it to use still greater force against Palestinians.

The same argument turns inward. In the United States and other relatively democratic societies, fear and demands for patriotism provided cover for measures intended to discipline populations and enact unpopular laws. The author characterizes the administration of George W. Bush as exploiting the crisis to pursue its program against the majority of the U.S. population, including future generations, while serving the narrow interests of powerful corporations. These claims form the book’s analysis of domestic political consequences; they are not presented as a neutral inventory of policies.

Assessment and Significance

The campaign’s significance, as the book depicts it, rests in the convergence of military expansion, political messaging, humanitarian disruption, and domestic control. The author regards the September 11 attacks as having accelerated trends already underway rather than creating an entirely new international order. The resulting changes include a new U.S. base network in Central Asia, greater ease of intervention, and an expanded opportunity for governments to associate coercive policies with counterterrorism.

The book’s account is therefore organized around a distinction between declared justification and observable effect. It questions whether military action should be understood only through official claims, and asks readers to attend as well to the people deprived of food, the populations exposed to intensified repression, and the strategic advantages gained. Its conclusion is not that the underlying international problems disappeared after September 11, but that the attacks produced consequential and, in the author’s judgment, often harmful changes in how power could be exercised and defended.