Lebanon
September 11Lebanon is a recurring setting in Noam Chomsky’s discussion of political violence, foreign intervention, and cycles of retaliation. Its place in the account is shaped by sharply contrasting episodes: a 1983 suicide bombing that helped drive U.S. forces out of Lebanon, Israeli military operations that Chomsky describes as causing extensive civilian harm, and a 1985 bombing outside a Beirut mosque that killed civilians while targeting a religious leader. Together, these examples support his argument that violence by states and non-state groups must be examined in context, and that military reprisal can deepen rather than resolve conflict.
U.S. and Israeli Military Involvement
Chomsky connects Lebanon to the history of U.S. military presence and to the armed groups that emerged from regional conflicts. He notes that an attack in 1983, possibly connected to the same forces involved in other regional violence, was a decisive factor in the departure of American forces from Lebanon. He also compares that episode with the later reversal of those groups’ weapons against the United States after it established a permanent military presence in Saudi Arabia. In this account, Lebanon is one point in a wider sequence in which military presence, resistance, and retaliation recur across different places and years.
The discussion also addresses Israeli operations in Lebanon and U.S. support for them. Chomsky says Israel’s 1982 invasion killed approximately 18,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, and emphasizes that it was not an act of self-defense, as he says was acknowledged at the time. He further describes subsequent violence against villagers and the Israeli operations of 1993 and 1996, both of which he says had firm U.S. backing. The 1996 Qana massacre prompted international reactions that, in his account, forced Bill Clinton to retreat from that support. He estimates that civilian deaths in Lebanon since 1982 probably reached 20,000.
The 1985 Beirut Bombing
A separate episode in Chomsky’s account is the 1985 bombing outside a mosque in Beirut. He describes a truck packed with explosives and positioned to kill as many civilians as possible. The bombing killed 80 people and wounded 250. Its intended target was a Muslim sheikh, who survived. Chomsky presents the event as an example of large-scale terrorism carried out with U.S. involvement, distinguishing the intended target from the much larger civilian toll.
The bombing appears within a wider argument that political violence should not be evaluated only by the identity of its perpetrators. Chomsky juxtaposes the Beirut attack with state actions and with U.S. support for Israeli military operations, using the cases to challenge a framework that condemns violence by adversaries while overlooking violence by powerful states or their allies.
Lebanon in the Cycle of Retaliation
Lebanon also figures in Chomsky’s warning about how reprisal can reproduce the conditions that prompt further violence. He argues that a massive assault on Muslim populations would answer the wishes of Osama bin Laden and his associates by helping them draw the United States and its allies into a destructive trap. In a later formulation, he warns that even killing Osama bin Laden could intensify anger, despair, and frustration if the response also caused a massacre of civilians. The concern is not limited to Lebanon, but Lebanon’s history of foreign military involvement and civilian casualties gives the warning a concrete regional context.
The same logic shapes Chomsky’s proposed alternative to retaliation: investigate crimes, establish responsibility, and pursue punishment through legal procedures, while also confronting the underlying fears and frustrations that may enable recruitment. He invokes the 1983 attack in Lebanon as part of a history in which military presence and political violence feed into one another. The account therefore treats Lebanon not simply as the location of separate attacks, but as a recurring example in an argument about escalation, civilian consequences, and the limits of force.
Strategic Geography and Wider Consequences
In his discussion of post-September 11 strategy, Chomsky places Lebanon within a broader regional landscape shaped by military reach and energy resources. He describes U.S. bases as extending from the Pacific to the Azores, with Diego Garcia previously serving as the most secure base for operations directed toward the Persian Gulf. He argues that the establishment of major U.S. bases in Central Asia improved the capacity for intervention around the Gulf. Lebanon’s episodes of intervention and conflict thus sit within an account that connects local violence to wider military networks and strategic aims.
Chomsky also compares the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia with the bombing of Afghanistan, arguing that both served, in significant part, to establish U.S. power and NATO credibility. In his analysis, such claims about strategic purpose should be distinguished from humanitarian or security justifications. Lebanon’s place in the article is part of that wider critique: military power can be exercised through direct intervention, support for allied forces, or retaliation, while the resulting civilian harm risks reinforcing the conflicts it is said to address.