September 11 Terrorist Attacks

The September 11 Terrorist Attacks are presented as an unequivocal terrorist crime, but also as a turning point whose aftermath strengthened policies already in motion. The book distinguishes condemnation of the attacks from the political uses of the term “terrorism”: it argues that the same standards should apply to state violence, while governments often reserve the label for enemies and invoke counterterrorism to justify their own actions.

Defining the Attacks

The account applies the official U.S. definition of terrorism: the calculated use or threat of violence to pursue political, religious, or ideological aims, including through intimidation, coercion, or fear. Under that definition, the attacks against the United States were unquestionably a terrorist act and an appalling terrorist crime. The author presents this conclusion as compatible with questioning the policies adopted in response; condemning the attacks does not settle whether subsequent uses of force or expansions of state power were justified.

The book contrasts this literal definition with a propagandistic convention in which “terrorism” means violence committed by enemies against the United States or its allies. In that usage, the label can change while conduct remains similar. As an example, it describes how the Kosovo Liberation Army was condemned by the United States as terrorist in 1998, then treated as a force of liberation after U.S. and British policy shifted toward attacking Serbia. The example frames the response to September 11 within a broader criticism: political alignment, rather than a consistent standard of violence, can determine who is called a terrorist.

An Occasion for Repression

The attacks, the author argues, accelerated trends that were already established, including the Bush Doctrine. Governments in several countries used the new counterterrorism campaign as an opportunity to introduce or intensify repressive policies. Russia sought room to continue its actions in Chechnya, while China also joined the coalition for comparable reasons. Turkey, the first country to offer troops for the new phase of the U.S. campaign, linked its offer to American support during its own campaign against the Kurdish population. Israel, in turn, recognized that it could intensify its actions against Palestinians with stronger U.S. backing.

The domestic consequences were also central to the author’s account. In societies including the United States, governments used the atmosphere of fear and demands for patriotism to impose restrictive measures and unpopular laws. The author characterizes the Bush administration’s actions as serving the interests of powerful corporations at the expense of the wider population, including future generations. This analysis treats counterterrorism not merely as a response to an external threat, but as a language through which governments could discipline people at home and advance existing political priorities.

Military Reach and Strategic Significance

A major consequence identified in the book was the establishment, for the first time, of substantial U.S. military bases in Central Asia. The author connects the new presence to the region’s considerable resources and to a strategic contest he calls the Great Game. He also places the bases within a wider network directed toward the Persian Gulf: before the war in Afghanistan, Diego Garcia had been the network’s most secure base; the new positions, he argues, improved the capacity for intervention.

The author interprets the post-attack campaign as an opportunity for the Bush administration to consolidate U.S. military superiority and pursue global dominance. He suggests that the Afghanistan bombings may have been intended, in part, to demonstrate what the United States could do to states that failed to follow its rules. He explicitly presents this account of purpose as an inference rather than a claim based on access to confidential documents. He compares it with the NATO bombing of Serbia, which Tony Blair and Bill Clinton had justified in terms of maintaining NATO’s credibility, and argues that such actions also serve to demonstrate the power of the United States and its principal arms client.

A Political Aftermath

In the author’s assessment, the September 11 Terrorist Attacks did not transform the basic structure of international problems, but they produced changes with significant and troubling consequences. The attacks became a rationale for measures abroad and at home, while also strengthening U.S. military positioning and the reach of its counterterrorism policy. The account therefore holds two points together: the attacks were a grave terrorist crime, and the response to them cannot be understood apart from the longer-running political interests and power relations that the author sees shaping it.