UN Charter Principle Prohibiting the Use of Force

The UN Charter Principle Prohibiting the Use of Force is presented as a postwar rule against the use of force, with a narrow exception for self-defense against an armed attack and a collective-security role for the Security Council. In Chomsky’s argument, it provides a common legal standard for judging both state and non-state violence, rather than a license for reprisals or for force directed at suspected offenders without proof.

The postwar rule and its limits

The principle is set against a history of reciprocal violence. Chomsky argues that the idea that an attacked nation should simply strike back would have sanctioned bombings of Washington by Nicaragua, South Vietnam, and Cuba, as well as Palestinian bombings in Tel Aviv. The postwar pact was designed to reject that logic after centuries of European warfare had brought the continent close to self-destruction. Under the Charter framework as he describes it, force is excluded except in self-defense against an armed attack, pending action by the Security Council to protect international peace and security; reprisals are specifically prohibited.

Chomsky applies that standard to the United States after September 11. He argues that the United States had not suffered an armed attack in the sense contemplated by Article 51, so that provision could not justify a retaliatory use of force—unless international law is understood to bind the United States as well as its adversaries. The argument turns on equal application: a rule that restrains only disfavored states would not function as a general legal principle.

Accountability instead of retaliation

The proposed alternative is to identify suspects, establish responsibility, and bring them before a court. Chomsky says that international legal institutions would likely endorse action to arrest and try Osama bin Laden and his associates, including the use of force, if their culpability could be demonstrated. He notes that the United States was widely asked to provide evidence of bin Laden’s involvement; if evidence were available, he argues, an international operation under United Nations auspices could secure broad support. He also reports that the Taliban had indicated possible diplomatic routes, which the United States rejected in favor of force.

The distinction between evidence-based enforcement and collective punishment is central to this application of the Charter. Chomsky invokes the proposal for a United Nations-backed police operation against a criminal conspiracy, followed by a fair international trial and punishment proportionate to any proven crimes. He considers the proposal reasonable while observing that its consistent application to all states would be politically difficult to accept.

Nicaragua as a test of consistency

Chomsky contrasts the proposed response to September 11 with the United States’ conduct toward Nicaragua in the 1980s. After the United States attacked Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice ruled in Nicaragua’s favor, ordered the United States to cease its actions and pay substantial reparations, and the United States rejected the ruling and intensified its attacks. Nicaragua then sought action through the United Nations Security Council, where the United States vetoed a resolution calling on states to respect international law. The United Nations General Assembly later adopted a similar resolution by a majority; the United States and Israel voted against it for two consecutive years, with El Salvador joining them once.

For Chomsky, Nicaragua’s recourse to courts and United Nations bodies exemplifies how a state should pursue redress rather than retaliate with attacks on civilians. He argues that the United States could use comparable legal procedures against those responsible for the September 11 attacks, and notes that countries involved in the conflict, including its allies, were asking it to do so. The comparison makes the principle reciprocal: the United States’ past refusal to comply with an adverse judgment sharpens the question of whether it will accept the same legal constraints when it claims injury.

Force, evidence, and strategic purpose

The book also tests the rule against the bombing of Afghanistan. Chomsky argues that the moral and legal case for bombing Afghans to compel the surrender of men suspected of crimes is difficult to establish, particularly when the stated objective later shifted toward overthrowing their rulers. His distinction is between a demonstrated basis for arrest and trial and the use of military force to compel a government or population to meet a political demand.

He further places the Afghan campaign beside the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia. He argues that the latter was justified in part by the need to establish NATO’s credibility, and that the Afghanistan bombings may likewise have served to demonstrate United States power and warn other states against defying its rules. The book presents this strategic interpretation as an inference, not as a disclosed documentary record: Chomsky says that confidential documents are unavailable, while suggesting that such consequences were likely calculated. The contrast between official justifications and proposed strategic purposes leaves the Charter principle as a test of both legality and consistency, not merely a formula invoked by governments when it suits them.