“Equality in inequality”
The Second Sex“Equality in inequality” is Simone de Beauvoir’s name for a contradiction embedded in relations between women and men: abstract assurances of equality meet concrete inequalities that shape what each partner can give, take, and expect. The phrase does not describe a settled balance. It identifies the language by which an unequal arrangement is presented as reciprocal, even as the parties experience its costs differently.
The contradiction in the phrase
De Beauvoir introduces the expression while discussing conflicts between the sexes. Neither side, she argues, fully accepts responsibility for the circumstances that one proposes and the other undergoes. The man may invoke an observable inequality to justify his authority; the woman may appeal to the abstract equality she has been promised. In this formulation, “equality in inequality” conceals both despotism and what De Beauvoir calls cowardice: a relation in which neither party’s account of fairness can be separated from the conditions that structure it.
The phrase therefore holds two levels of the relationship together without treating them as equivalent. Equality exists as a guarantee or ideal, while inequality is lived in the parties’ actual positions. The resulting conflict is not merely a disagreement over intentions. It arises because the same exchange can carry different meanings and values for each person.
A comparison shaped by unequal histories
The expression belongs to a wider analysis of how groups become defined as essential subjects or as subordinate others. De Beauvoir contrasts women’s situation with that of groups whose histories include a more identifiable before: the Jewish Diaspora, slavery in America, and colonial conquest. The comparison with the proletariat is, in one respect, closer, because proletarians, like women, are not a numerical minority. But she distinguishes the histories: class formation has a historical development, whereas women have been subordinate to men for as long as history can be traced, a condition that can appear immutable because it is associated with biological difference.
That difference affects collective action. Proletarians and Black people can name themselves as a “we” and contest the group that has positioned them as other. Women, De Beauvoir argues, have not generally formed an independent collective subject: they are dispersed among men and tied to fathers or husbands through homes, work, economic interests, and social conditions. Class and race further divide them; bourgeois women may share interests with bourgeois men, and white women with white men, rather than with working-class or Black women. The phrase’s tension between formal equality and lived inequality thus sits within a larger account of why shared subordination does not automatically produce solidarity.
The language of separate equality
De Beauvoir also links the expression’s underlying contradiction to the claim that women may have “separate but equal status.” In her account, this supposedly egalitarian formula legitimates discrimination by preserving separation while asserting equality. She compares its operation with Jim Crow laws in the United States, arguing that the same pattern appears when race, caste, class, or sex is used to assign a group an inferior position and then present that position as evidence of its inferiority.
This comparison does not make the histories identical. De Beauvoir distinguishes the situation of Jews, who are treated by the anti-Semite as enemies and denied a place of their own, from the paternalism directed at women and Black people, whose supposed virtues are praised when they remain within roles chosen for them. The recurring mechanism is circular: a group is restricted, and the resulting condition is then used to defend the restriction. In that context, “equality in inequality” names not a harmonious compromise but a claim of fairness that leaves the arrangement producing inequality intact.
The economic terms of exchange
The phrase becomes especially concrete when De Beauvoir turns to relationships and the value each partner assigns to shared time. A man who is integrated into social life may regard an evening as time he could spend advancing his career, seeing friends, cultivating useful connections, or enjoying himself. For an idle and bored woman, the same hours may be time she wants to fill; his presence can therefore feel like a benefit to her while requiring him to surrender activities that have positive value in his wider life.
This imbalance shapes the terms of intimacy. De Beauvoir describes the woman as seeking not only the sexual attention a man may want, but also conversation and outings, while the man may regard those additional hours as a cost. If she asks for too much of his time, he may withdraw; she then moderates what she asks for. The image of the shopkeeper who will not sell potatoes unless the customer also takes turnips captures the unequal bargain: what appears to be one exchange consists of goods that do not carry equal significance for the parties. The relationship’s measure of fairness depends not simply on what each gives, but on the value each has been able to attach to time, company, and other possible pursuits.
Significance
“Equality in inequality” condenses De Beauvoir’s criticism of a social arrangement that promises parity while distributing freedom and value unevenly. It connects private disagreements between partners to broader structures of gender, class, and race, while preserving distinctions among their histories. The expression’s force lies in its refusal to let the language of equality settle the question: the bargain must also be judged by the conditions under which it is made, the alternatives available to each party, and the unequal worth each can assign to what is exchanged.