Léon Richer
The Second SexLéon Richer was a French feminist organizer whom Simone de Beauvoir calls the true founder of feminism in France. He launched Le Droit des Femmes in 1869 and organized the International Congress of Women’s Rights in 1878. These efforts belong to a broader account of women’s claims for civil and political equality, but the account also stresses how limited and divided the movement remained.
Feminist Organizing and Public Advocacy
Richer’s work followed the public advocacy of Maria Deraismes, who addressed women’s issues in lectures between 1868 and 1871 and took part in controversy over the advice that a husband should kill an unfaithful wife. In 1869, Richer established Le Droit des Femmes, giving the movement a newspaper through which women’s rights could be publicly discussed. He then organized the 1878 International Congress of Women’s Rights, extending that advocacy into a congress devoted to the issue.
At this stage, the movement had not yet made the vote its central demand. Women in France and England mainly claimed civil rights, and the campaign remained cautious for roughly thirty years. Richer’s newspaper and congress therefore represent organized advocacy within a movement whose immediate claims and public reach were still restricted.
A Movement Divided by Class and Strategy
The account places Richer’s organizing beside the movement’s internal divisions. Women were joined first to their social classes, Beauvoir argues, rather than united in a common political solidarity: bourgeois and proletarian interests did not readily converge. Revolutionary feminists drew on Saint-Simonian and Marxist traditions, while Louise Michel opposed feminism when she believed it diverted energy from class struggle. The Socialist Congress of 1879 proclaimed equality between the sexes, but a strategy that expected women’s freedom to follow from workers’ emancipation could leave the women’s cause secondary.
Bourgeois reformers, by contrast, sought new rights within existing society and also promoted reforms of social behavior. This divergence helps explain why the public institutions Richer built did not, by themselves, resolve the movement’s limited effectiveness. The account presents his work as part of an emerging feminist infrastructure, while locating its difficulties in the unequal conditions and competing priorities that shaped women’s political action.
Formal Rights and Material Constraints
The historical argument surrounding Richer’s activism distinguishes legal status from concrete power. In its account of Roman society, women’s rights and authority varied with their economic role and position within the family; across periods, formal rights alone did not determine women’s actual circumstances. Beauvoir applies the same distinction to modern France, where legal changes accumulated unevenly and did not immediately produce equality between spouses.
The restoration of divorce in 1884, for example, allowed a wife to seek divorce if her husband committed adultery, while adultery remained a criminal offense only when committed by a wife. Guardianship rights expanded in stages, and the married woman’s legal status was modified in 1938 and 1942, when the duty of obedience was abolished. Even then, the father remained head of the family, and the law’s assertion that a married woman had full legal powers was qualified by restrictions in marriage contracts and law. Richer’s campaign thus appears within a longer struggle in which public demands for rights confronted both legal inequality and the persistence of customary and economic dependence.
Significance in the History of Women’s Claims
Richer’s specific contribution in the account is organizational: a newspaper in 1869 and an international congress in 1878 helped give women’s rights a sustained public forum. The surrounding history resists treating such milestones as proof of emancipation. Women’s movements faced class divisions, disagreement over the relation between feminism and socialism, and institutions whose formal reforms often left practical inequalities intact.
This tension is central to Beauvoir’s broader analysis. A woman may be recognized in principle as an autonomous subject while being placed in a world that constrains her projects and treats her as inessential. Richer’s work belongs to the effort to challenge that condition through public claims and collective organization; the account’s wider chronology makes clear that advocacy was a beginning, not a completed transformation.