Ahmed Ezz

Ahmed Ezz was one of the businessmen closest to Egypt’s Mubarak regime: chairman of Ezz Steel, the country’s largest steel producer, and a senior figure in the ruling National Democratic Party. His dual position in business and government exemplifies the book’s account of a political economy in which connected firms could benefit from restricted competition, public contracts, and privileged access to finance.

Position in Business and Government

Ezz chaired Ezz Steel, which produced 70 percent of Egypt’s steel, and held a high-ranking position in the National Democratic Party. He also chaired the People’s Assembly Budget and Planning Committee and was a close associate of Gamal Mubarak, one of President Mubarak’s sons. These roles placed him at once within a dominant industrial company, the ruling party, and a parliamentary committee concerned with public finance and planning.

The account situates Ezz among businessmen close to the regime who received state protection as well as government contracts and large bank loans without collateral. It identifies iron and steel as one of several concentrated sectors where regulation restricted entry and helped shelter politically connected firms. Ezz’s prominence therefore rests not only on the scale of his company but on the overlap between commercial power and political access.

Markets, Barriers, and Privatization

The book describes the Egyptian economy as containing sectors with high entry barriers, including media, iron and steel, automobiles, alcoholic beverages, and cement. Business leaders persuaded the government to restrict competition through state regulation; the resulting market concentration protected established firms and their owners. Ezz’s steel company is given as a striking measure of that concentration: it produced 70 percent of the national output.

This system is presented as part of a wider pattern rather than as an isolated company’s success. The book argues that businessmen connected to the regime could influence economic rules and benefit from public resources, while rivals and potential entrants faced a tilted playing field. Ezz’s combination of industrial leadership and political office makes him a particularly clear example of that entanglement.

Significance

Ezz’s career illustrates the book’s distinction between market reform in name and competitive markets in practice. International financial institutions and economists promoted reforms in the 1990s that aimed to free markets and reduce the state’s economic role, with privatization as a central instrument. But the book warns that privatizing state assets does not itself ensure competition: politically connected elites can influence how privatization is carried out and preserve or acquire concentrated control.

In this account, Ezz is significant as a representative of a system in which economic influence and political authority reinforced one another. His company’s commanding share of steel production, his party rank, his parliamentary committee chairmanship, and his closeness to Gamal Mubarak are presented together, showing how concentrated private power could be embedded within the institutions meant to govern the economy.