Readify

Menem court expansion

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

Menem court expansion was President Carlos Saúl Menem’s 1990 enlargement of Argentina’s Supreme Court from five seats to nine, allowing him to appoint four new justices and gain a majority. The episode showed how a formally democratic government could weaken judicial independence by changing the institution meant to constrain executive power—and how that maneuver carried forward a pattern established under Juan Domingo Perón.

Background: a Court already made vulnerable

The Court’s vulnerability had deep roots. Shortly after Perón won the presidency in 1946, his supporters in the Chamber of Deputies initiated impeachment proceedings against four of the five justices. The charges included the Court’s acceptance of the legality of military regimes in 1930 and 1943, as well as its decisions striking down legislation. One recent ruling had declared Perón’s new national labor relations board unconstitutional. Nine months after the process began, the Chamber impeached three judges; the fourth had resigned. The Senate approved the motion, and Perón appointed four replacements, freeing his government from an important political constraint.

The precedent outlasted Perón’s government, which was removed by a coup in 1955. Military and civilian administrations alike selected their own justices, and the practice became normal in Argentine politics. The pattern persisted even after the return to democracy: changing governments did not necessarily preserve the Court’s independence as a limit on presidential authority.

Menem’s campaign and the expansion

When Menem prepared to take office, the sitting justices had been appointed after the 1983 transition to democracy by the Radical Party president Raúl Alfonsín. Menem had no democratic-transition precedent requiring him to replace them. Nevertheless, before the election he repeatedly sought to encourage—or intimidate—members of the Court into resigning. He offered Justice Carlos Fayt an ambassadorship. Fayt rebuffed the offer by sending Menem a copy of his book Law and Ethics, inscribed with the warning, “Beware I wrote this”.

Menem proceeded through legislation. Within three months of taking office, he sent the Chamber of Deputies a proposal to expand the Court from five members to nine. He argued, among other things, that the Court was overworked, an argument the account compares to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s justification for his own 1937 court proposal. The bill passed quickly through both the Chamber and the Senate. Its practical consequence was decisive: Menem could appoint four new justices and thereby command a majority on the Court.

Consequences: a recurring challenge to judicial independence

The expansion was more than a change in the Court’s size. It strengthened the executive’s influence over an institution that might otherwise have constrained presidential power, and reinforced the convention that each new president could select justices in keeping with political interests. In the book’s account, the judiciary’s potential role as an independent check was thereby diminished.

The episode also formed part of a wider pattern in which formal elections coexisted with concentrated political power and weak institutional restraints. Later, when Menem faced a term limit, he moved to rewrite the constitution so he could run again. His attempt to rewrite it a second time after reelection was blocked not by Argentina’s political institutions, but by factions within his own Perónist Party resisting his personal domination. The court expansion thus sits within a larger account of how executive power could erode constraints, and how opposition within political factions—not a securely independent Court—could become the obstacle to further concentration.