Zimbabwe’s history in this account illustrates how extractive institutions can outlast the political regimes that establish or inherit them. British colonial rule created a dual economy; after independence, Robert Mugabe and the core of ZANU-PF preserved elite power through a distinct political arrangement, while a formally independent central bank proved unable to resist executive demands. The result links the country’s colonial institutional inheritance to postcolonial political control and severe inflation.

Colonial Inheritance and Political Rule

The book distinguishes Zimbabwe’s institutional origins from those of Sierra Leone. British colonial regimes established both countries’ extractive institutions in the late nineteenth century, but in Sierra Leone, where there were no white settlers, colonial rule built on precolonial structures of political power and intensified them. In Zimbabwe, the British South Africa Company instead created a dual economy. These different beginnings shaped the forms of extraction that persisted after colonial rule.

After independence, the ruling elite comprised Robert Mugabe and the core of ZANU-PF, the party that had spearheaded the anticolonial struggle in the 1970s. The account contrasts their political arrangement with North Korea’s one-party rule: Zimbabwe did not adopt the same model, in part because Mugabe’s route to power meant that his rule had to be cloaked in elections. For a time, he nevertheless managed to establish a constitutionally sanctioned one-party state. The electoral form therefore coexisted with the concentration and reproduction of elite power.

Institutional Persistence and Political Change

Zimbabwe’s example forms part of a broader comparison among countries whose institutions differ in detail but share an extractive logic: elites design economic arrangements to enrich themselves and preserve power at the expense of most of society. The book traces Zimbabwe’s extractive institutions to the colonial system created by the British South Africa Company, and argues that institutional arrangements can continue to reproduce elite advantage even as the country’s political circumstances change.

The account also places Zimbabwe within the historical interaction of institutional persistence and contingency. Extractive systems can reinforce themselves, but their continuation is not inevitable: broad coalitions, inclusive elements already present in institutions, or contingent historical events can interrupt the cycle. Zimbabwe’s case helps clarify the stakes of that argument, showing how changing formal political arrangements does not by itself guarantee a transition to inclusive institutions.

Central Bank Independence and Inflation

In 1995, Mugabe declared Zimbabwe’s central bank independent in response to international advice that independent central banks could resist political pressure to finance government spending by printing money. The reform did not change the underlying political relationship. Inflation, around 20 percent before the declaration, reached 140 percent by 2002, almost 600 percent by 2003, 66,000 percent by 2007, and 230 million percent by 2008.

The figures make the gap between formal rules and effective authority stark. A law declaring the central bank independent did not prevent political demands from overriding that independence. The book connects this failure to the wider institutional setting: where leaders retain power over state institutions, adopting a recommended policy on paper can leave the operating balance of power untouched. Zimbabwe’s case thus illustrates the limits of policy reform without political change.

Significance in the Comparative Argument

Zimbabwe is not treated as an isolated case of poor policy or as a consequence of geography or culture. It is one example in a comparison spanning countries with different histories, languages, colonial experiences, and political structures, which the book argues share extractive institutions. In Zimbabwe, colonial dualism and the post-independence ruling elite provide the specific historical sequence; the central-bank episode shows how that sequence could shape a later economic policy’s actual effects.

The account’s central contrast is between institutional form and institutional power. Elections and a declaration of central-bank independence existed, yet neither necessarily constrained those who controlled the state. Zimbabwe therefore contributes to the book’s explanation of why formal reforms may be adopted without being implemented in substance, and why changing institutions requires more than announcing new rules.