Antonio López de Santa Anna

Antonio López de Santa Anna’s repeated returns to Mexico’s presidency made him a defining figure in the country’s first half-century of independence. His career, marked by abrupt transfers of power and rule that constitutional procedures did little to restrain, illustrates how political instability weakened the state, undermined property rights, and helped sustain economic institutions that enriched privileged groups while limiting opportunities for the broader population.

From Soldier to President

Santa Anna was the son of a colonial official in Veracruz. He first rose to prominence as a soldier fighting on Spain’s side in the wars of independence, then switched sides in 1821 to join Agustín de Iturbide. The account presents that change as a decisive turn in his political trajectory: Santa Anna entered the new order and became a recurring participant in the struggles over who would govern Mexico.

His first presidency began in May 1833, but he exercised power for less than a month, preferring to let Valentín Gómez Farías serve as president. Gómez Farías’s tenure lasted only fifteen days before Santa Anna retook power. That return was also brief: Gómez Farías again replaced him in early July. The two men continued this alternating arrangement until the middle of 1835, when Santa Anna was replaced by Miguel Barragán. The succession of short tenures showed how little stable authority the office itself guaranteed.

Santa Anna did not disappear from national politics after that displacement. He returned to the presidency in 1839, 1841, 1844, and 1847, and again from 1853 to 1855. Across these spells he was president eleven times. The repeated changes were not merely episodes in one politician’s career: between 1824 and 1867, Mexico had fifty-two presidents, few of whom came to power through constitutionally sanctioned procedures.

Power, War, and Territorial Loss

Santa Anna’s presidencies coincided with grave military and territorial setbacks. Under his leadership Mexico suffered the loss of the Alamo and Texas, and the disastrous Mexican-American War resulted in the loss of the territory that became New Mexico and Arizona. These outcomes place his recurrent political authority against a wider background of national vulnerability: a president could hold office while the government’s capacity to control the country remained limited.

The book emphasizes that large parts of Mexico were outside Santa Anna’s control even while he was president. That weakness enabled the annexation of Texas by the United States. The contrast is central to the significance assigned to his rule: the problem was not simply that administrations changed frequently, but that political authority was so fractured that the state could not reliably govern its territory or protect a stable institutional order.

Instability and the Weak State

The consequences of the instability associated with Santa Anna’s era extended beyond the presidency. The repeated disruptions produced highly insecure property rights and severely weakened the Mexican state, leaving it with little authority and little ability to raise taxes or provide public services. Political turnover was thus linked to practical limits on government: the state lacked both the continuity and the reach needed to establish dependable rules across the country.

The account also places independence within a longer institutional history. Mexico’s declaration of independence was motivated in part by a desire to protect economic institutions developed during the colonial period. Alexander von Humboldt described the country as one of inequality, and the inherited system, based on the exploitation of Indigenous people and the creation of monopolies, blocked economic incentives and initiatives for much of the population. Santa Anna’s era did not create that structure from nothing; rather, chronic instability and weak state authority allowed an exclusionary economic order to persist without dependable constraints.

From Santa Anna to Díaz

The political pattern outlasted Santa Anna. After the French government’s abortive attempt to establish a colonial regime under Emperor Maximilian between 1864 and 1867, the French were expelled and a new constitution was written. The governments of Benito Juárez and, after his death, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada were then challenged by Porfirio Díaz, a military commander who had fought successfully against the French. Díaz formed a rebel army, defeated the government’s forces at the Battle of Tecoac in November 1876, and had himself elected president the following May.

Díaz ruled in a more or less unbroken and increasingly authoritarian fashion until his overthrow at the outbreak of the revolution thirty-four years later. The comparison with Santa Anna is explicit: both, like Iturbide, began as military commanders and used force in the struggle for power. In the United States, by contrast, military figures such as George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower held the presidency without using force to enter or remain in office; they abided by the Constitution. Mexico had constitutions too, but in the book’s account they placed few effective constraints on Iturbide, Santa Anna, or Díaz. Such rulers could be removed only by the same means through which they had attained power: force.

Property, Privilege, and the Wider Divergence

Santa Anna’s political legacy also appears in the continuity of economic privilege. The book describes Díaz as violating property rights, facilitating the expropriation of vast amounts of land, and granting monopolies and favors to supporters across business, including banking. It identifies this conduct not as a new departure but as a recurrence of practices associated with the Spanish conquistadors and with Santa Anna. The connection is institutional: concentrated political power could be used to redistribute property and market access toward allies, leaving the wider population with fewer secure rights and opportunities.

This record supports the book’s rejection of explanations that blame Mexico’s divergence from the United States on leaders’ ignorance or intentions. The argument is that leaders and elites faced different institutional constraints. In the United States, political accountability helped limit the creation of monopolies for private advantage; in Mexico, unstable governments and weak constitutional checks allowed powerful actors to use office and force to protect privilege. Santa Anna’s repeated presidencies therefore serve as more than a succession of political episodes. They make visible a cycle in which contested power weakened the state, insecure institutions restricted broad participation in economic life, and political privilege endured beyond any single ruler.