American Relations with the Soviet Union

American Relations with the Soviet Union was a secret analysis commissioned by Harry S. Truman that gathered warnings about Soviet policy into a sweeping account of an international crisis. Researched chiefly by George Elsey and directed and edited by Clark Clifford, it described Soviet expansion as a challenge extending from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and Asia. Its importance lay not only in its alarming assessment, but also in its argument that the United States should answer that challenge with military preparedness and support for threatened democracies.

Commission and Preparation

In July 1946, Truman asked Clark Clifford to prepare a comprehensive analysis of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the first project of its kind for the administration. The work began promptly. George Elsey, Clifford’s assistant, had proposed the project because he thought Truman was assessing the Soviet Union too narrowly, often concentrating on whether it honored agreements. Clifford remained in charge and, through his editing, helped shape the finished report’s tone and emphasis; Elsey did most of the research and writing.

Completed in September 1946, the report ran to nearly 100,000 words. Its extensive documentation drew on interviews with and written reports from a dozen or more important officials in the executive branch, including people in the State and War departments. The analysis was influenced by George Kennan’s Long Telegram, but presented a more alarming overall picture. Elsey later observed that much of its information had already been brought to Truman’s attention by James F. Byrnes, James Forrestal, Averell Harriman, William D. Leahy, and Harry Hopkins, some as early as April 1945. The report’s distinctive contribution was to collect these concerns in one document and connect them into a broad strategic assessment.

Assessment of Soviet Power and Expansion

The report opened by identifying relations with the Soviet Union as the gravest problem facing the United States. It judged that Soviet leaders were pursuing expansion that could ultimately lead to world domination. In Europe, it argued that Soviet opposition to British-American peace settlements prolonged the presence of Red Army forces in former enemy countries. It described Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria as already under Soviet domination, and warned that only the presence of British, French, and American occupation troops prevented a Soviet takeover in Austria.

The assessment extended beyond Europe. It noted the growth of Communist parties in France and Italy and argued that Soviet influence in a weak, divided China exceeded that of any other country. The report said that the Soviet Union was supplying Chinese Communist forces. In Korea, it concluded that the Soviets would agree to unification only if the resulting government were friendly to them. In the Middle East, it warned that Soviet leaders wanted British troops to leave Greece so that a friendly government could be established there, and sought a compliant Turkey that could serve as a base for influence over the eastern Mediterranean.

The report treated Soviet military capacity as especially ominous. It described the Soviet Union as maintaining forces stronger than those of any likely combination of foreign powers while rapidly developing a self-sufficient economy. It also warned that Soviet leaders were extending their area of control to protect the Soviet Union’s vital regions. The military threat, in the report’s account, was growing to include atomic weapons, guided missiles, biological-warfare materials, a strategic air force, and long-range submarines. It further accused the Soviet Union of directing espionage and subversive movements in the United States.

Recommendations and Political Sensitivity

From this assessment, the report drew a demanding policy conclusion. It argued that the United States needed sufficient military strength to confine Soviet influence and should be prepared for atomic and biological warfare. Preparedness, it maintained, might itself deter Soviet aggression and thus help preserve peace. The report also recommended that the United States support and assist democratic countries threatened or endangered by the Soviet Union. The resulting position linked military capacity abroad with political support for vulnerable governments; it was broader than a response to any single crisis or aid request.

George Kennan reviewed a nearly completed draft and judged it excellent. Truman spent much of one night reading the final report, then called Clifford at home early the next morning to ask how many copies existed. When Clifford said there were ten, Truman ordered the other nine placed under lock and key. He considered the document so sensitive that its public release could seriously damage his attempts to resolve the conflict between East and West peacefully. The concern showed the tension between the report’s stark public implications and Truman’s wish to preserve room for diplomacy.

Influence and Afterlife

The report’s exact influence on Truman’s decisions is difficult to establish. Clifford later emphasized its far-reaching effect, while Elsey was more cautious, suggesting that gathering the information into a single document may have influenced the President without claiming that its role could be measured. The evidence therefore supports neither treating the report as a definitive blueprint for Truman’s policy nor dismissing its importance: it consolidated analysis already reaching him and gave it a more comprehensive, forceful form.

Its clearest documented policy afterlife came in the spring of 1947. After Truman returned from Mexico, Clifford and Elsey helped finish the speech he would deliver to Congress about the crisis in Greece, and much of that speech came directly from the report. The immediate context was urgent: after Britain announced its withdrawal, George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson urged Truman to provide substantial and prompt aid to Greece, with a quarter of a billion dollars needed for the remainder of 1947. The report thus helped connect an emergency assistance decision to a larger argument about Soviet influence and American support for threatened democracies.