Totalist negotiation model

The Totalist negotiation model is the all-at-once, impersonal approach to diplomacy that Terje Rød-Larsen identifies as a recurring cause of failed negotiations. Its significance in the play comes chiefly through its contrast with Gradualism: rather than making every dispute a condition for progress, Gradualism addresses one issue at a time and seeks to build trust as negotiations advance.

Definition and contrast

In a lecture to a packed hall, Rød-Larsen describes Totalism as a model in which all points of disagreement and all organizations representing the parties are brought to the table together. The procedure is rigid and impersonal; he says that negotiations conducted this way repeatedly end in absolute failure. The model is presented as a general approach to international relations, not merely as a description of one meeting.

Rød-Larsen proposes Gradualism as the alternative. Rooted in personal rather than organizational relations, it narrows discussion to a single issue, resolves that issue, and then moves to the next. The gradual sequence is meant to allow adversaries to build a bond of trust. In the play’s formulation, the distinction is therefore not simply between a broad and a narrow agenda: it is between treating negotiation as a complete, procedural settlement of all disagreements and treating it as a developing relationship in which progress on one issue can make the next possible.

The lecture also establishes that this alternative carries risks. Rød-Larsen warns that activating the personal dimension can release intense conflict, that events may accelerate once the process begins, and that participants may be pushed to a breaking point. He nevertheless argues that the risks are worth taking if the effort can change the world. His appeal to Mona Juul sharpens that argument: after they witness events affecting two boys, he asks whether they would not try anything to give the boys a different narrative, and says that the unlikely possibility of success is reason enough to act.

Political pressure and authorization

The negotiations unfold amid events that complicate any attempt to isolate issues or build confidence. The night before a planned meeting, an Israeli border guard is killed, and Israel retaliates by deporting four hundred Palestinians accused of terrorist links to southern Lebanon, where they are left without basic supplies. The sequence makes clear that a negotiation agenda exists within a rapidly changing political environment; violence and retaliation can alter the conditions under which participants are expected to continue.

A later crisis also demonstrates how political pressure can affect the channel. In March 1993, after a Palestinian youth kills two Israelis in Tel Aviv, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin seals Gaza. Yossi Beilin argues that the government could not have kept the border open without facing severe political consequences. Yet he also tells Rød-Larsen that the Palestinians remain willing to continue discussions if the Israeli participants return for another round. Continued contact is possible, but it is constrained by events and by the political costs of appearing to make concessions.

The question of official status presents another constraint. After reporting that substantial progress was made in a two-day meeting and that the Palestinians wish to return, Rød-Larsen asks Beilin to upgrade the Israeli delegation to official status. Beilin replies that Israel has no delegation to upgrade and that doing so would be illegal. The exchange exposes a gap between practical progress in the talks and the formal authority needed to recognize or advance them. It also shows why an incremental process cannot be reduced to a simple sequence of interpersonal agreements: participants remain bound by institutional and political limits.

Issue-by-issue bargaining

Several exchanges give concrete form to the difference between general procedure and proposals focused on particular issues. When Ahmed Qurie asks where the Israeli side has directly answered the Palestinian offer to take control of Gaza, Yair Hirschfeld points to the draft Declaration of Principles. Qurie responds that the draft contains eloquent generalities rather than a direct answer to the specific offer. His objection identifies a problem of substance: a document can appear comprehensive while leaving a concrete proposal unanswered.

The parties continue to contest both the substance and the scope of the draft. Uri Savir says that much of it is open to discussion but insists that demands he considers impossible must first be removed. Qurie says he considers the demands possible; Savir then states that Israel will not negotiate over sovereignty of Jerusalem, either in the room or in a document. On Gaza, Savir says Israel is willing to relinquish control, and Qurie makes acceptance conditional on Israel relinquishing control of Jericho at the same time. Rather than resolving every disagreement at once, the exchange brings individual claims and conditions into view—and shows how quickly a proposed step can lead to another linked demand.

A later exchange illustrates reciprocal movement more clearly. Qurie agrees to drop the demand that outstanding disputes be referred to international arbitration; Savir agrees to negotiate the transfer of Gaza and Jericho. The agreement is limited to negotiating those transfers, not completing them. Savir then proposes a way to manage the political presentation of the compromise: each side can report a hostile exchange at home, while he plans to have Rød-Larsen call two days later with agreement to the Palestinian demands. The scene links substantive bargaining to the problem of what negotiators can say to their respective leaders and constituencies.

The dispute over checkpoints shows the same combination of a concrete proposal and an unresolved limit. Qurie accepts Israeli responsibility for border security but demands joint control of all checkpoints. Shimon Peres rejects ceding control of the checkpoints and soldiers. Qurie responds with a threat to burn the document and wage war, while also remaining open to a counterproposal. The exchange does not produce a resolution; it reveals how negotiation can continue alongside maximal demands, refusal, and an invitation to propose another arrangement.

Significance and limits

The play does not present the Totalist model as a neutral description of every negotiating encounter. It is Rød-Larsen’s critique of an approach he believes has repeatedly failed, set against his advocacy of gradual, personal engagement. The bargaining scenes support that contrast through particular offers, counterconditions, concessions, and unresolved questions rather than by showing the parties simply settling every issue together.

At the same time, the contrast does not promise that gradual progress will be smooth or sufficient. Violence, public pressure, legal restrictions, disagreements over Jerusalem, and disputes about security and territorial control persist. Even when the participants express a shared desire for the process to succeed, that desire does not itself settle what they can concede. The concept’s dramatic force lies in this tension: gradual negotiation offers a way forward through specific exchanges and developing trust, but it must work inside a conflict whose crises and political constraints keep threatening to pull every issue back into the same, overwhelming whole.