Harry S. Truman–Averell Harriman relationship

Harry S. Truman–Averell Harriman relationship was an important wartime advisory partnership, tested by the Korean War’s military emergencies and the dispute over Douglas MacArthur’s public conduct. Truman recalled Harriman from Europe to serve as a special assistant, entrusted him with sensitive communications to MacArthur, and heard his assessments of both military strategy and command. Harriman could urge a course directly, but the decisions remained Truman’s: the relationship shows an adviser working close to presidential power without displacing the President’s responsibility for it.

From Diplomatic Envoy to War Adviser

In the final week of June, Truman recalled Harriman from Europe, where he had served as a roving ambassador, and made him a special assistant for war-emergency problems. One of Harriman’s first concerns was the constitutional and political basis for Truman’s actions in Korea. He urged the President to seek a war resolution from Congress while public support remained strong. Dean Acheson disagreed, arguing that Truman could act under his authority as Commander in Chief and that asking Congress might cause more harm than it prevented.

Truman sided with Acheson. He told Harriman that appealing to Congress at that moment could make it harder for future presidents to handle emergencies. Harriman later judged the decision a mistake, but also regarded it as characteristic of Truman: the President weighed not only the immediate crisis but the precedent his choice might establish for presidential authority. Their exchange illustrates a central feature of the partnership. Harriman offered forceful counsel, including on the institutional consequences of a decision, while Truman retained the authority to accept or reject it.

The MacArthur Mission and the Incheon Plan

Harriman’s role soon extended from policy advice to direct military diplomacy. Truman sent him to Tokyo to convey two points to MacArthur: the President was determined to provide the resources the general needed, but he also wanted to avoid any action that might provoke a third world war. In particular, MacArthur was to keep clear of Chiang Kai-shek, whose involvement Truman feared could trigger a wider conflict with the Chinese Communists. Harriman was suited to the delicate assignment in part because he had known MacArthur on a first-name basis since MacArthur was superintendent at West Point in 1920.

Harriman left for Tokyo on August 4, accompanied by Matthew Ridgway and Lauris Norstad, and returned to Washington on August 9. He went straight from the airport to Blair House, without stopping for breakfast or to shave or shower, so he could brief Truman early, when he expected to find the President alone. MacArthur had assured Harriman that he would obey the President’s direction concerning Chiang, though Harriman remained uncertain about the general’s tone. That reservation mattered: Truman’s instructions concerned not merely the conduct of one commander but the risk that a military initiative could draw the United States into a broader war.

Harriman also brought back MacArthur’s proposal for an amphibious landing at Incheon, intended to strike behind North Korean forces. The plan promised a chance to reverse the military situation, but its practical obstacles were severe. The port’s tides could reach thirty feet or more; there were no beaches, only sea walls; and landing craft would have a narrow period after high tide before they were stranded in the mud. Harriman made clear to Truman how difficult the operation would be, including the danger that reinforcements could not land until the next high tide.

Truman told Harriman to consult Louis Johnson and Omar Bradley as quickly as possible. He did not make an explicit commitment to the plan, yet Harriman left believing the President approved it. On August 10, after a series of intense meetings at the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council approved the strategy in principle. Their approval did not end the debate: Bradley and other senior officers continued to express grave reservations, even as the operation moved through further discussions in Tokyo and Washington.

Insubordination and a Hardening Recommendation

The mission also exposed the limits of Harriman’s effort to keep MacArthur within Truman’s policy. On August 26, an Associated Press report carried MacArthur’s public defense of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang’s control of Formosa. The statement crossed into foreign policy, despite MacArthur’s assurance to Harriman that he would follow presidential orders. Truman was furious and considered, but rejected, relieving MacArthur immediately. He said he did not want the removal to look like a demotion or to hurt MacArthur personally. Instead, he directed Johnson to have the general withdraw the statement and dictated the message himself when Johnson hesitated.

The conflict deepened the following spring. After MacArthur’s public statements and his letter to House Minority Leader Joe Martin became part of the growing dispute, Truman met with his senior civilian and military advisers. At the April 6 meeting, Harriman urged immediate dismissal, arguing that MacArthur had been a problem for too long. Secretary of State George Marshall urged caution; Acheson emphasized the need to consider how a dismissal should be carried out. Truman disclosed neither a settled decision nor his personal view, directing the advisers to meet again and examine the situation further.

Collective Counsel and Presidential Decision

Harriman’s advice formed part of a broader process rather than a private understanding that Truman would automatically follow. In a subsequent meeting at Blair House, Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, and Harriman each agreed that MacArthur should be relieved. Only after they had spoken did Truman say that he shared their view. He then instructed Bradley to prepare the necessary papers. Harriman’s recommendation was direct, but its force came within a collective judgment that included both civilian and military advisers.

Across the relationship, Harriman served as messenger, policy advocate, and interpreter of a volatile military command. He warned Truman about the possible cost of seeking congressional authorization, conveyed the President’s limits to MacArthur, reported on a daring but hazardous operational plan, and ultimately pressed for the general’s removal. Truman sometimes followed his advice, sometimes chose another course, and at crucial moments kept his decision private until advisers had been heard. The partnership therefore joined close access with a clear boundary: Harriman could bring information and counsel to the President, but Truman held responsibility for the nation’s policy and for the final command decision.