U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy emerges in this account both as a powerful wartime customer and as an institution whose decisions and procurement practices were subject to civilian investigation. Its requirements helped shape the production of aircraft and ships, but unclear specifications and weak oversight could impede that production or leave serious problems undiscovered. Through the Truman Committee’s inquiries, Harry S. Truman pressed for facts about military procurement and argued that the conduct of the war must remain under civilian authority. In 1950, naval forces again figured in national policy, this time as part of the United States’ response to the invasion of South Korea and its effort to guard the Formosa Strait.

Wartime Production and Coordination

In 1941, Truman visited San Diego on a trip that included a look at a new Marine base camp and a tour of the Consolidated aircraft plant, described to him as the largest of its kind. The managers he spoke with offered conflicting accounts of conditions: each portrayed their own operation as sound while describing another as in trouble. By questioning five or six managers separately, Truman pieced together a less reassuring picture. Aircraft production was substantial, he found, but could have been greater if the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army had settled on what planes they wanted.

That observation became part of a broader concern about fragmented planning. The Truman Committee later reported that aircraft production had been left largely to manufacturers to determine, and concluded, “There is no planned or coordinated program for the production of aircraft.” The problem was not simply whether factories could produce planes; it was whether government agencies and military services could state their needs and organize production accordingly. The Navy’s requirements therefore mattered beyond its own orders: in the absence of clear, coordinated decisions, industrial capacity could not be directed as effectively as it might have been.

The investigation also set military demand against competing uses of scarce materials. Automobile manufacturers continued producing cars during the first eight months of 1941, consuming about 18 percent of available steel and 80 percent of available rubber, even as the aircraft program lagged. The committee also criticized the Office of Production Management for failing to recognize the need for sharply increased supplies of copper, lead, and zinc. Truman regarded steel shortages as especially serious. The Navy appears within this picture as one of the services whose demand had to be coordinated with manufacturing capacity and the national allocation of strategic resources.

Shipbuilding, Steel, and Procurement Oversight

The committee’s scrutiny extended from production planning to the quality of materials used in ships. During a hearing, Senator Brewster read from a Bureau of Ships investigation concerning the SS Schenectady. The report attributed the vessel’s failure most directly to very poor steel, describing the plate as inferior and brittle. Brewster challenged Perry over whether he had read the report and pressed him to consider the consequences for servicemen travelling overseas. Perry replied that he did not condone defective steel in ships or elsewhere in the war effort. The exchange made procurement quality a matter of public accountability rather than a technical detail confined to shipyards and naval offices.

The committee also examined the relationship between the Navy and private shipbuilders. It found the Navy “extremely liberal” with private shipyards. A representative of Todd Shipyards Corporation, discussing one Navy contract, said that without taxes the company could not have handled its profits with a steam shovel. The committee’s concern was not confined to whether ships were being built, but included the terms under which public contracts were awarded and whether the government had adequate grounds for judging performance and cost.

A related problem arose when the committee investigated Canol, a proposed four-inch oil pipeline running 1,200 miles from Canada to Alaska. The project had been advanced by General Brehon B. Somervell without a request for the Navy’s opinion or participation. At a hearing, Truman read a letter confirming that a search of Navy files had found no record that the service had been consulted, either in writing or orally. Somervell maintained that Canol was not a Navy matter. Truman countered that ships consumed substantial quantities of oil, making naval views relevant to a project intended to supply it. The exchange revealed how a military undertaking could proceed without consultation even with a service that might have an operational interest in its output.

Civilian Oversight and Military Authority

Truman’s inquiries reflected a larger concern about the growth of military influence over the economy. He backed Donald M. Nelson as a single civilian head for procurement, even where he disagreed with Nelson, because he believed the war effort needed unified administration and a leader answerable for overall results. He also worried that generals and admirals were gaining influence over industry and agriculture. In a 1942 broadcast, he called civilian control the foremost issue of the day and warned that it could shape the country’s political and economic structure after the war.

His formulation distinguished military expertise from ultimate political authority: “The function of generals and admirals is to fight battles,” he said, “and to tell us what they need to fight battles with.” The distinction did not dismiss military requirements; it placed responsibility for deciding how those requirements were met within a civilian system. The Canol hearings illustrated the practical value of that principle. The committee could question a general, compare his account with the Navy’s records, and test whether a project had been planned with appropriate consultation. In this account, scrutiny of the Navy and of other military institutions served both as procurement oversight and as a defense of civilian responsibility for public resources.

Naval Forces in the Korean Crisis

In June 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the U.S. Navy became part of a rapidly expanding American response. At an emergency meeting, the decisions Truman made included sending the Seventh Fleet to guard the Formosa Strait, with the stated aim of preventing an attack from Communist China on Formosa or an attack in the other direction. At a subsequent meeting, Truman decided to provide American air and naval support to South Korean forces and to seek immediate support from the United Nations. As the situation worsened, he ordered American air and naval forces to support South Korea, while keeping military action north of the 38th parallel off the table for the time being.

These decisions situated naval power within a wider political and strategic framework. Truman wanted the United Nations to respond to armed aggression and regarded the crisis as a test of whether the organization could act effectively. He also resisted an immediate appeal to Congress for a war resolution, agreeing with Dean Acheson that invoking presidential authority was preferable in the emergency and might preserve options for future presidents. The evidence here records decisions about naval support and fleet deployment, rather than a separate account of naval operations. It nevertheless shows the U.S. Navy’s place in the administration’s response: its forces were among the instruments used to support South Korea, protect the Formosa Strait, and pursue a policy framed in terms of collective security and presidential responsibility.