War Production Board

The War Production Board was one of the civilian institutions whose expertise mattered to wartime production, but the account presents it chiefly through a contrast: a major military construction project proceeded with little regard for the Board’s views. That episode gave concrete force to Harry S. Truman’s broader concern that the conduct of the war—and the economic power mobilized to sustain it—remain under civilian control.

Role in Wartime Production

The War Production Board appears among the agencies and experts whose views were not adequately considered when military leaders launched the Canol pipeline project. The plan called for a four-inch pipeline stretching 1,200 miles from Canada to Alaska. It was approved secretly, with little thought given to terrain, climate, available materials and manpower, or the advice of oil experts, the Corps of Engineers, and the War Production Board.

The project’s financing underscored how much could be set in motion with limited civilian scrutiny: a $25 million item was added to the War Department budget with no description beyond the construction of military facilities in Canada and Alaska. In this episode, the Board’s significance lies not in a recorded decision of its own but in the expertise and oversight that the project’s planners largely bypassed.

Civilian Oversight and Military Power

Truman’s concern extended beyond any single contract. In the first six months of 1942, military contracts added $400 billion to the economy, and he watched generals and admirals gain influence over industry and agriculture. In a fall 1942 broadcast, he described civilian control as the foremost issue of the day and warned that its consequences could shape the country’s political and economic structure after the war.

His position distinguished military responsibility for fighting from civilian authority over the larger purposes and organization of the war effort. The War Production Board belonged to that civilian landscape: its presence among the agencies whose views were neglected in the Canol affair made the conflict between military initiative and broader civilian oversight tangible.

The Canol Project as a Test Case

The Canol pipeline was described as having been set in motion by General Brehon Somervell without adequate attention to practical constraints or outside advice. Its secrecy was intended primarily to avoid interference from other civilian parts of government, especially the Interior Department and its petroleum administration. When Secretary Harold Ickes brought the project before the Truman Committee, he characterized its origin as a one-page memorandum from Somervell; the committee reached a similarly critical assessment after hearing from the project’s chief adviser, James H. Graham.

For the War Production Board, the episode records institutional exclusion rather than a direct confrontation: its views were among those given little weight in a project whose scale, planning, and secrecy raised questions about accountability. The account therefore connects the Board to a larger wartime issue—the need to coordinate production while keeping military authority answerable to civilian institutions.