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White House

Truman

The White House was at once Harry S. Truman’s residence, the seat of executive decision-making, and a public symbol whose rooms and traditions carried political weight. During Truman’s presidency it framed the shock of succession, the work of governing, and the restoration of national ceremony. Its own physical deterioration ultimately required the president to leave it for more than three years, turning the care of the building into a major undertaking and, for Truman, a source of unusual personal satisfaction.

A house inherited with the presidency

When Franklin D. Roosevelt died, the White House became the setting for Truman’s abrupt passage from vice president to president. In the private quarters, Eleanor Roosevelt was waiting in a sitting room with members of her family and staff. She came forward and gently placed an arm on Truman’s shoulder. Soon afterward, Truman began arranging the immediate business of succession: the Cabinet was to assemble, the Chief Justice was to administer the oath, congressional leaders were summoned, and a car was sent for Bess Wallace Truman and their daughter. Bess had not been listening to the radio; Truman’s telephone call was the first she had heard of Roosevelt’s death.

The oath was administered in a room with a marble mantelpiece beneath a portrait of Woodrow Wilson. Bess, their daughter, and others gathered as reporters, photographers, and newsreel cameramen entered. The scene was hurried and confused, but the clock on the mantel recorded its exact place in the transition: 7:09, two hours and twenty-four minutes after Roosevelt’s death. The White House’s domestic rooms had become a stage for a constitutional transfer of power, observed by family and press together.

The rooms also carried the imprint of the president who had occupied them before Truman. Roosevelt’s office remained arranged as he had left it, with ship models and naval prints on apple-green walls. A staff member had cleared the desk of pictures and small objects, but the office still felt unmistakably Roosevelt’s. Truman sat in the high-backed leather chair, rolling it back and forth, turning, and leaning into it as though testing the space he had inherited. The building offered a new president a working office, but not an emotionally blank one: its furnishings made continuity and loss tangible.

The White House as a working seat of government

Truman’s first presidential decision came in a White House meeting with his Cabinet. Asked whether the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations would open as planned in twelve days, he answered emphatically that it would. The decision was made at a table where Roosevelt had often sat alone, contemplating Woodrow Wilson’s failure to establish the League of Nations. The setting joined an immediate administrative choice to the longer history of American efforts to build international institutions.

The inherited staff and rooms shaped other consequential deliberations. For a landmark meeting on April 23, the Oval Office filled with officials Roosevelt would have assembled: senior figures from the departments of state and war, military leaders, and diplomatic advisers. Truman had brought no former Senate aide, personal foreign-policy adviser, or Missouri associate into the group; apart from Truman himself, the gathering consisted of Roosevelt’s people. The arrangement showed how much of the new president’s first foreign-policy machinery was inherited rather than assembled around his own circle.

The White House was also where executive responsibility took a personal form. In a private meeting there, Henry L. Stimson gave Truman a newly typed memorandum, several pages long, and waited while he read it. Stimson had written it that morning, and its opening sentence was intended to shock. In the deliberations that followed, an entirely civilian and highly secret Interim Committee had an advisory role, while Stimson alone was responsible for making a recommendation to the president. Truman understood that the final judgment, and its consequences, could not be delegated away.

The building’s ordinary routines mattered alongside these exceptional meetings. Truman held a regular morning meeting with a staff of thirteen, two more than Roosevelt’s, and served as his own chief of staff. The meetings were informal but orderly and businesslike. At nine o’clock he opened his office door, and the staff filed in one by one. The White House functioned not only as the venue for major decisions but as a daily system for supplying the president with information and direction.

That system did not always run smoothly. By mid-October, staff members were worried about confusion in the White House, and Truman acknowledged feeling discouraged by how things were going. He said he would reduce appointments and cancel some trips. Eben Ayers, an assistant press secretary who privately kept a diary, worried that stories about Harry Vaughan, poker games, and drinking might eventually cause trouble. The pressures of the office were thus recorded both in formal meetings and in the private observations of staff who watched the presidency at close range.

A contested alteration and an unhappy residence

Truman’s personal stake in the building was visible in a proposed balcony on the South Portico. He wanted an outdoor space connected to the upstairs Oval Study where his family could have privacy. The proposal would make the first major change to the mansion since the North Portico was added during Andrew Jackson’s time, and it was Truman’s own idea. The Fine Arts Commission and much of the press objected; critics mocked him as Back Porch Harry and argued that he was meddling with a house that did not belong to him and that he might not occupy for long.

Truman stood by the plan. He argued that Jefferson had used comparable upper galleries in his buildings at the University of Virginia and insisted that the balcony would make the White House look right while removing the need for unsightly awnings. Its overnight notoriety exposed the tension between a president’s practical claim to improve his residence and the public’s sense that the building belonged to the nation. The building could be the president’s home in daily use and, at the same time, a national landmark over which his personal preferences were contested.

For much of his early time in office, Truman found living there difficult and lonely. He referred to the White House derisively as the great white jail, the great white sepulcher of ambitions, or the taxpayers’ house. Yet his relationship with it was not simply one of confinement. After the war, he and Bess restored state dinners and receptions in the mansion’s formal rooms, insisting on respect for tradition in detail. The return of ceremony brought pageantry back to the house and gave Truman evident pleasure, even as private life there could feel isolating.

Evacuation, renovation, and return

The White House’s most serious crisis was structural rather than ceremonial. After a vacation at Key West, Truman and his family were living across Pennsylvania Avenue at Blair House, 1651 Pennsylvania Avenue. The president had been told that the old Executive Mansion was in such dangerous condition that it could collapse at any moment. The facts were made public, and the White House closed to visitors. The family went to Key West while painters and decorators worked around the clock to ready Blair House; furniture was moved in so that it could accommodate them by Thanksgiving.

Truman privately welcomed the move because it gave him the opportunity to see the White House restored properly. He loved building and history and took a genuine interest in the project’s details. The architect in charge described the president’s wish for a restoration so complete that the building’s structure and principal fixed architectural finishes would endure for generations. At the time, the work was expected to take a year, but the family’s absence from the White House would last three years and four months.

The renovation was planned for six months, and dismantling began on December 13, 1949. Truman had hoped to control the project himself on the grounds that it was the president’s house, but Congress declined to give him full responsibility. A six-member Congressional Commission on the Renovation of the Executive Mansion was established, with members appointed by the president: two senators, two representatives, and the presidents of the American Society of Civil Engineers and the American Institute of Architects. Kenneth McKellar chaired the commission, while Glen E. Edgerton became executive director. The White House architect, Lorenzo Winslow, worked most directly with Truman.

The West Wing, built by Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, remained sound and continued in service. Truman therefore walked to the Oval Office from Blair House, crossing Pennsylvania Avenue in the morning, twice at lunchtime, and again at day’s end, flanked by Secret Service agents. Tourists watched as traffic stopped for the presidential commute. On one occasion, a car with Virginia plates nearly struck him; after stopping sharply, its driver put both hands to his head, while Truman continued on unconcerned. The daily crossing made the separation between home and office literal, but the functioning of the presidency continued on the other side of the street.

After three years and four months away, Truman returned to the White House looking tanned and pleased. The completed restoration gave him satisfaction beyond the practical repair of a dangerous structure. He had once experienced the building as a lonely place and a taxpayer-supported burden; he also left office as its restorer and guardian, taking pride in preserving one of the federal city’s oldest buildings. In the closing years of his presidency, few accomplishments pleased him as much as ensuring that the White House would endure.