John R. Steelman

John R. Steelman was a labor specialist on Harry S. Truman’s White House staff whose most clearly documented role was as the President’s principal representative during the 1946 railroad strike crisis. As negotiations threatened to halt the country’s industrial, agricultural, commercial, and social life, Steelman carried proposals between railway unions and management, made repeated attempts to break the deadlock, and stayed in contact with the White House until a settlement was announced in Congress. The episode shows both the practical work of presidential mediation and its limits: Steelman could keep negotiations moving, but the two union leaders resisted even after he invoked the authority of the presidency.

White House Role

Steelman was a new member of Truman’s staff, described as a large, gregarious, gum-chewing former economics professor and labor specialist from Alabama. He initially assisted Labor Secretary Lewis Schwellenbach, whose work as mediator in the railway negotiations was not proving effective. As the talks grew more urgent, Steelman replaced Schwellenbach as Truman’s principal representative in the dispute.

The negotiations involved railway management and twenty unions, which had been bargaining over wage increases for months. Truman invoked the Railway Labor Act’s sixty-day mediation period to delay a strike while negotiations continued. In April, the talks broke down and a strike was set for May 18. Though bargaining resumed, nearly all the unions’ readiness to reach an accommodation could not resolve the dispute: the two remaining holdouts were also the most consequential, and their leaders would not accept the President’s proposal.

Repeated Efforts to Break the Deadlock

During the five-day postponement of the strike, attempts to find a compromise repeatedly failed. Ed Flynn came to Washington to try to persuade the holdout leaders, Alexander F. Whitney and Alvanley Johnston, but did not succeed. Truman also ordered the seizure of the coal mines and proposed an 18½-cent raise for rail workers, exceeding the recommendation of his emergency fact-finding board. Whitney and Johnston viewed the proposal unfavorably, leaving the strike unresolved as its scheduled start drew near.

On May 23, the day the strike was due to begin at 5:00 p.m. Washington time, Whitney and Johnston were summoned again, along with representatives of management. The parties were placed in separate rooms, and Steelman moved between them to continue the bargaining. When the union leaders again refused Truman’s offer, Steelman argued that they could not simply say no to a President. They answered that nobody paid attention to this President. Their retort exposed the gap between the office’s formal authority and its ability to secure compliance through persuasion.

The Last Negotiation and Settlement

The following Saturday, with Truman due to address Congress at four o’clock, Steelman made one more attempt at the leaders’ suite in the Statler Hotel. At three, he called to report progress and suggested that the strike might be settled within an hour. Truman’s speech was nearly ready, but the possibility of an agreement remained uncertain. Samuel Rosenman and Clark Clifford prepared alternative pages in case the situation changed; at 3:35, Steelman called again to say that it was still unresolved.

As Truman began speaking to Congress, Steelman reported by telephone to Clifford that the union leaders had verbally agreed to written points. The agreement was still only in longhand and had yet to be typed and signed, so its completion was not certain. Clifford remained by the phone. During the address, Senate Secretary Les Biffle brought Truman a red note from Clifford, and Truman announced that the strike had been settled on terms he had proposed. The announcement came while Steelman’s work was still being finalized, making the settlement’s timing dramatic without establishing that the moment had been staged.

Significance of His Part

The account presents Steelman as an intermediary working under pressure rather than as the public face of the settlement. He kept contact with both sides, tried successive approaches, and continued bargaining even as the strike deadline and Truman’s address converged. His role was substantial but bounded: he could shuttle between separate rooms, press the President’s proposal, and report progress, but he could not make the union leaders accept it by invoking presidential authority alone.

The outcome became a public test of Truman’s resolve, while Steelman’s contribution remained chiefly within the negotiations. His telephone updates supplied the White House with the changing status of the talks at the decisive moment: first cautious optimism, then continued uncertainty, and finally word of verbal agreement. The episode therefore locates his importance in the mechanics of mediation—the repeated, largely unseen work that carried a dispute from deadlock toward settlement.