Louis A. Johnson

Louis A. Johnson was a forceful defense official whose tenure as Secretary of Defense joined two priorities that did not always sit easily together: cutting what he regarded as wasteful military spending and maintaining American security amid the emerging nuclear competition. Appointed by Harry S. Truman to replace James V. Forrestal, he pursued economy with conspicuous speed, unsettling the military establishment even as he carried out a policy Truman supported. Johnson also took part in the secret debate over the hydrogen bomb, where he sided with moving ahead.

Appointment and transition

Johnson had been considered as Forrestal’s replacement for some time. He had led the Whistlestop Campaign and previously served as an Assistant Secretary of War under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Forrestal agreed to the choice, at least in his stated response. When Johnson met him to discuss the transition, however, he privately concluded after an hour that Forrestal was insane or might be taking drugs, a judgment he later related to Drew Pearson.

Forrestal had asked to resign well before he left office, but Truman had kept him in the job. Truman later wrote that he should have allowed Forrestal to quit when he wanted, and described his departure as the result of failing health. On March 1, Truman summoned Forrestal to the White House to request his resignation and urged him to take a vacation, without discussing medical treatment. The succession brought Johnson, who was known for getting things done and for his experience in the defense department, into an office whose responsibilities were already under pressure.

Reorganizing the Pentagon

Johnson moved quickly and dramatically. His first act was to take over the Pentagon’s largest office, displacing several high-ranking officers; he brought back General John J. Pershing’s old desk and installed Steve Early, Roosevelt’s former press secretary, as a deputy. He also rearranged roughly half the Pentagon’s workforce—about 25,000 employees—in a vast reshuffling, abolished outdated service boards, and reduced the use of official cars. The scale and abruptness of these changes made his administration feel less like a gradual transition than a forceful remaking of the department.

The cuts reflected Truman’s own convictions. Drawing on his experience with the Truman Committee, Truman believed large sums were being wasted on defense and distrusted generals and admirals as guardians of military spending. In late April, without warning either Truman or the Secretary of the Navy, Johnson canceled construction of the new $186 million supercarrier United States, a major element in the Navy’s program. The decision led Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan to resign in anger. Truman liked Sullivan and did not blame him for leaving, but nevertheless approved the cancellation. He supported the goal of economy even as Johnson’s manner troubled him.

In May, Johnson ordered a further $1.4 billion cut from the military budget, to the disbelief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Critics warned that the reductions weakened national defense; Johnson answered with a boastful claim about America’s ability to defeat the Soviet Union. His public confidence contrasted with the alarm of those who saw the cuts as a threat to military preparedness. The book presents the episode as a dispute not only over budgets but also over who should judge the country’s defense needs.

A controversial style

Johnson differed sharply from Forrestal. Where Forrestal was described as small, introverted, and almost excessively apolitical, Johnson was loud, physically imposing, and openly ambitious in style. He shouted to make his point to admirals and generals, and the press reported speculation about his motives. Because of that speculation, he publicly denied several times that he intended to run for President. One unnamed senior official summed up the reaction to his cost-cutting by saying that Johnson made two enemies for every dollar he saved.

His methods brought approval as well as resistance. Democrats and Republicans in Congress initially welcomed his reputation as a hardheaded official who could get results, and the Senate approved his appointment unanimously. But his aggressive changes soon made him a controversial presence. Truman’s support for spending restraint did not remove his unease with Johnson’s way of operating: the cancellation of the carrier shows how the President could endorse a decision’s substance while remaining troubled by how his secretary carried it out.

The hydrogen-bomb decision

Johnson also figured in the administration’s secret deliberations over whether to develop the hydrogen bomb. The debate lasted from November 1949 through the end of January 1950 and unfolded largely in Dean Acheson’s fifth-floor office at the State Department. A three-member committee comprising Acheson, Johnson, and David E. Lilienthal met only twice, on December 22 and January 31; Acheson attributed the limited meetings primarily to Johnson’s acerbic nature, and Johnson and Lilienthal argued bitterly.

At the final session, held on January 31 in Room 216 of the Old State Department Building, Acheson took charge and presented a draft presidential statement in favor of proceeding with the bomb. Johnson agreed. Lilienthal objected to making the decision in an atmosphere of excitement, warning that a rushed commitment could close off a different approach to the nuclear arms race, distort defense spending and foreign policy, and give the public dangerous confidence in a new weapon. Acheson acknowledged the force of Lilienthal’s objections but argued that delay would not delay Soviet efforts and that Americans would not accept a policy of waiting. Johnson’s agreement placed him on the side of immediate development, though the evidence locates his role within a small, secret committee rather than presenting him as the sole author of the decision.

Significance

Johnson’s record reveals both the reach and the limits of his power as Secretary of Defense. He could reorganize the Pentagon, slash budgets, and cancel a major Navy project; he could also help shape a consequential nuclear recommendation. Yet these actions depended on the President’s backing and provoked resistance from military leaders, fellow advisers, and cabinet colleagues. Truman authorized the economy Johnson pursued but remained troubled by Johnson’s methods, while Lilienthal’s opposition exposed the unresolved stakes behind the decision to proceed with the hydrogen bomb. Johnson emerges as an energetic administrator whose drive for results repeatedly turned policy choices into confrontations.