John W. Snyder

John W. Snyder became one of Harry S. Truman’s most trusted financial officials, but his public image was less compelling than Truman’s confidence in him. A cautious, conservative St. Louis banker, he was regarded by Truman as hardworking and sensible, yet his appointment to a senior Cabinet post was criticized as uninspiring and suggestive of government by cronies. His years in office placed him at the intersection of Truman’s personal judgments, the administration’s financial responsibilities, and the political costs of difficult decisions.

Appointment and Early Trust

On April 14, 1945, Truman’s second day as President, he decided to make Snyder a federal loan official and called Jesse Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to announce the appointment. Jones asked whether the President had made the decision before Franklin D. Roosevelt died. Truman replied that he had made it just then. The exchange established the new President’s authority in a moment when even the mechanics of succession could be uncertain, while also showing that Snyder was among the people Truman was ready to install in government immediately.

Snyder’s rise continued when Truman selected him to replace Fred M. Vinson as Secretary of the Treasury. Vinson was being appointed Chief Justice, and the Treasury vacancy gave Truman the opportunity to promote a man he trusted. The choice was made with striking speed: when asked when he had decided on Vinson and Snyder, Truman said he had settled on Vinson about an hour and a half earlier. The haste reinforced the impression that he was making appointments quickly, an impression he could not entirely avoid.

The choice also contrasted the reputations of the two men. Truman had come to admire Vinson as a devoted and politically loyal public servant. Snyder, by comparison, was known less for brilliance or charm than for diligence and caution. Reporters portrayed him as a dour, small-town banker, and liberals and former New Dealers regarded his selection as especially disappointing. Some saw the appointment as evidence of government by cronies. Yet the book’s portrait complicates that caricature: Snyder worked long hours, often seven days a week, possessed personal warmth, and had the practical common sense Truman valued.

A Trusted Place in Truman’s Circle

Truman’s confidence in Snyder was not confined to formal appointments. In August 1946, wanting to escape both Washington and Independence, he chose a cruise aboard the presidential yacht Williamsburg and invited Snyder to join an all-male party of friends and advisers. The party included Truman’s old friend Ted Marks, Charlie Ross, Clark Clifford, Harry Vaughan, Matt Connelly, George Allen, and Colonel Graham. The boat offered Truman a brief retreat from the pressures of office; Snyder’s inclusion placed him among the President’s companions as well as his Cabinet officers.

Snyder also occupied a visible place in the administration’s public work. During Truman’s address to Congress outlining support for Greece and Turkey, he sat in the front row with his head bowed as Truman read slowly from an open notebook. The posture is recorded as a detail of the scene, not as an explanation of Snyder’s view of the policy. It nevertheless locates the Treasury secretary close to the President at a moment when the administration was presenting a consequential argument about American action abroad.

His relationship with Truman was particularly clear during the steel crisis. In the run-up to Truman’s decision to seize the mills, Snyder opposed taking that step. His caution put him on the other side of a choice Truman believed necessary, even though the President trusted him and consulted him. Their disagreement shows that Snyder’s access did not mean that his advice always prevailed: Truman could value a trusted adviser and still judge that the situation demanded a different course.

Treasury Responsibilities and the Tax Bureau

As Treasury secretary, Snyder spent more than a year trying to investigate persistent reports of corruption in tax collectors’ offices around the country. He made little headway at first. In April 1951, the collector in St. Louis resigned after a grand jury cleared him; in July, Truman fired collectors in Boston and San Francisco, and associates of the San Francisco collector were suspended. A few months later, the collector in Brooklyn was also dismissed.

The appointments had roots in the earlier administration: all four collectors had been appointed by Bob Hannegan when he headed the Bureau of Internal Revenue under Roosevelt. They had understood that tax collection could remain only a part-time responsibility, leaving them free to pursue other work. The book describes corrupt practices, or at minimum serious irregularities, during their terms; several faced indictments, and the Brooklyn collector had accumulated wealth far beyond his government salary. Snyder’s efforts therefore belonged to a larger problem in which rumors, political appointments, and entrenched practices made clean administration difficult. The record does not credit him with personally removing the collectors; Truman carried out the dismissals as the investigation proceeded.

Caution and the Steel Seizure Dispute

The dispute over the steel mills brought Snyder’s caution into direct conflict with Truman’s resolve. The crisis had grown from a labor dispute involving 650,000 steelworkers, who sought higher wages while the companies resisted the proposed settlement and pressed for a substantial increase in steel prices. Truman believed that a stoppage would threaten the flow of weapons to troops in Korea and the buildup of forces in Europe. He also regarded the industry’s price demands as profiteering that would raise the government’s defense costs and undermine anti-inflation policy.

Truman’s legal advisers supported his view that he could seize the mills, and Fred Vinson, now Chief Justice, confidentially advised him that the seizure was legally permissible. Snyder, described as ever cautious, opposed the move. Truman nevertheless told his staff that the President had power to prevent the country from going to ruin. On April 8, 1952, only hours before the mills were expected to be struck, Truman signed Executive Order No. 10340 and took control of them. The episode distinguishes Snyder’s counsel from Vinson’s: it was Vinson, not Snyder, who offered the reported legal assurance, while Snyder’s opposition did not alter Truman’s decision.

Snyder’s role in this crisis captures the limits as well as the value of his position. His caution was consistent with the conservative, methodical temperament described in the account, while Truman’s decision was driven by his assessment of the emergency and by his distrust of the steel companies’ demands. The President relied on Snyder’s experience in government without treating his judgment as binding. In that respect, Snyder’s service was not a story of uninterrupted agreement but of an adviser remaining close to a President whose decisions could outrun his caution.