Robert E. Hannegan

Robert E. Hannegan was a St. Louis Democratic organizer who helped shape Harry S. Truman’s political fortunes at two critical moments: the razor-close 1940 Senate primary and the contested 1944 vice-presidential nomination. His career joined local party organization to national political maneuvering. The book presents him as an energetic, effective ally whose loyalty to Truman could be decisive, but whose actions at the convention were sufficiently contradictory that their purpose remained uncertain.

Background and Political Rise

Hannegan was the son of a St. Louis police chief and a hale, broad-shouldered young Irish-American. He had been a star athlete at St. Louis University and, after law school, played semi-professional baseball for a time. Since 1933 he had been active in Democratic politics, learning his trade in the rough school of the Dickmann organization and eventually becoming city chairman.

That background mattered because Hannegan was not simply a campaign worker brought in for a single race. He was an experienced local organizer, already embedded in a political network that could mobilize support. Yet in 1940 he was working for Lloyd C. Stark, not Truman. His eventual defection therefore carried both practical value and a striking personal contradiction: the man who became one of Truman’s favorites had just abandoned another candidate for whom he had been working.

The 1940 Switch and Truman’s Narrow Victory

With only two days remaining before the primary, Hannegan suddenly left Stark’s campaign and began working feverishly for Truman. Bennett Clark was the crucial intermediary. The account does not establish exactly what Clark said or promised to bring about the switch, only that it must have been convincing. Truman would later regard Hannegan’s arrival as the biggest break of the campaign.

The result was close. Truman won by fewer than 8,000 votes out of 665,000 cast. In St. Louis, his margin over Stark was 8,411 votes—the same city where Hannegan had concentrated his last-minute efforts after Clark helped bring him over. Truman also carried the Black vote and did better among farmers than he had in 1934. In Jackson County, where association with the Pendergast organization was widely thought to have become a political liability, he still won by 20,000 votes. The outcome thus depended on more than Hannegan alone: Truman’s own standing, Jim Pendergast’s work, and what remained of the organization also counted. But the narrow St. Louis margin makes Hannegan’s late intervention unusually tangible.

The reversal left an asymmetry in Truman’s regard. Hannegan had walked out on Stark, yet Truman thereafter could see little fault in him. The narrative explicitly observes that Truman would have regarded a similar act by someone against himself as rank betrayal. The episode suggests that political allegiance, in this instance, was judged less by a consistent rule than by the consequences of the choice: Hannegan’s break with Stark became, to Truman, proof of help rather than proof of disloyalty.

National Influence and the 1944 Contest

By 1944 Hannegan had advanced well beyond city politics. He had become Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was a great favorite of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and was in line to replace Frank Walker as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Alongside powerful party figures, he helped organize opposition to Henry A. Wallace, repeatedly speaking against Wallace’s continuation on the ticket.

On June 27, Hannegan told Roosevelt that Wallace had to be removed. He argued that agreement on James F. Byrnes would let the party move smoothly through the convention and election. This was a forceful intervention from a party official whose proximity to Roosevelt made his advice consequential. It also shows that, at this stage, Hannegan was advocating Byrnes, not Truman.

At the convention, however, his conduct became harder to read. The account describes him as playing a deceitful game, while allowing that he may have been acting at Roosevelt’s direction—or may not have been. Hannegan telephoned Byrnes and told him that the vice presidency was settled, that Roosevelt had given the green light to support him, and that he wanted Byrnes in Chicago. This assurance sat uneasily beside the eventual outcome. The book does not resolve whether Hannegan was conveying a real presidential commitment, maneuvering on his own, or following instructions whose purpose was not apparent to others.

The Decision for Truman

When Edward J. Flynn put a call through to Roosevelt in San Diego, the men involved spoke to the President one by one. Roosevelt ultimately agreed that Truman should be the choice. Hannegan then visited Truman in his room at the Stevens and showed him a handwritten note that, according to Truman’s recollection, said that the President wanted Truman. Truman was not persuaded that the note proved Roosevelt’s intent. He remembered it as being written on scratch paper rather than an envelope, and he later said he still could not be sure the message reflected Roosevelt’s wishes.

That uncertainty is central to Hannegan’s place in the nomination story. He was the person who brought Truman the purported presidential confirmation, but Truman’s own account did not treat the note as conclusive. The episode leaves a distinction between political outcome and demonstrated authorization: Truman was eventually selected, yet the surviving account preserves his doubts about how confidently Hannegan could attribute the decision to Roosevelt.

The convention’s final movement also exceeded Hannegan’s influence. Hannegan, Flynn, Edward J. Kelly, and their associates worked through the night, speaking with delegates and applying pressure. The account reports that Frank Walker telephoned every delegation chairman by morning, while leaving the number and nature of any political bargains unknown. On the second ballot, Flynn delivered 74 New York votes to Truman, moving him ahead of Wallace. The narrative emphasizes Flynn’s decisive role in persuading Roosevelt, resisting the assumption that Byrnes was already settled, and delivering New York’s votes. Hannegan was an important operator in the coalition, but not its sole architect.

Truman’s Ally in Office

After Roosevelt’s death, Truman made Hannegan Postmaster General, replacing the ailing Walker. The appointment followed the traditional pattern of rewarding a party chairman with the post, and it confirmed Hannegan’s place in Truman’s political circle. Earlier, he had risen from city organization to national party leadership; now he held a cabinet-level position in Truman’s administration.

The book’s recurring image of Hannegan is one of motion between political worlds: the local organizer who could make a late campaign switch count, the national official who pressed Roosevelt over the ticket, and the messenger whose report Truman received but did not wholly trust. His effectiveness is clearest where concrete results can be traced, especially in the final St. Louis effort in 1940. In 1944, his importance is equally evident, but his intentions are less certain. That contrast makes him more than a loyal aide: he is a political broker whose work helped determine outcomes even when the precise boundaries between personal initiative, party strategy, and presidential instruction remained blurred.